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INTRODUCTION
ORPORATE compliance monitors are everywhere. From Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations to securities fraud to 
general violations of federal law—compliance monitors are a constant in 
today’s society. When a federal or state governmental entity determines 
that a corporation has engaged in wrongdoing or violated federal law, it 
often enters into an agreement with the corporation requiring the corpo-
ration to retain a corporate compliance monitor.1 Despite its name, a 
monitor is often not charged with “monitoring compliance.” Instead, a 
monitor, oftentimes a lawyer but sometimes an accountant or other high-
ly skilled professional, is retained to investigate the compliance failure 
that resulted in the legal or regulatory violation, assess the cause of the 
1 Monitors are known by many different names, including independent consultant, inde-
pendent compliance consultant, and corporate compliance monitor, amongst others. See F. 
Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA 
Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 321, 322 n.2 (2011). See 
generally Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., for Heads of 
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Morford Memorandum], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf (outlin-
ing principles to consider when selecting and using a corporate monitor). 
C
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compliance failure, and analyze the company’s unique business struc-
tures against the legal and regulatory requirements.2 This allows a moni-
tor to provide an individualized set of recommendations for the corpora-
tion to implement. 
There are a variety of reasons why monitorships are utilized when a 
compliance failure occurs within a corporation. Monitorships shift the 
costs of enforcement from the government and the public to the corpora-
tion. They are also an added assurance of future legal and regulatory 
compliance by a corporation that has been deemed untrustworthy as a 
result of the prior compliance failure. To date, academic inquiry regard-
ing corporate compliance monitors has focused primarily on when it is 
appropriate to appoint a monitor;3 the optimal scope of a monitor’s au-
thority;4 the common features of monitorships, like the length of moni-
torships and the number of reports a monitor is required to provide the 
government;5 how monitorships work in practice;6 and whether monitors 
should owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.7 The goal of this research 
has focused on (1) suggesting mechanisms for “enhancing the potential 
of corporate monitors to serve a useful deterrent and law enforcement 
function without being unduly burdensome on corporations”;8 and 
(2) advocating “a monitorship process that incorporates some of the 
learning that has emerged from compliance professionals about the im-
portance of organizational culture.”9 There has not, however, been a sys-
2 This is essentially a form of root-cause analysis. See infra Part I. 
3 Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Cor-
porate Czar?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1713, 1713, 1715–20 (2007) (providing “descriptive [and] 
normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors” that include an examination 
of “when it is desirable to appoint monitors and what powers and obligations they should 
have”); see also Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corpo-
rate Compliance?, 34 J. Corp. L. 679, 732–34 (2009) (discussing the difficulties inherent in 
being a corporate monitor); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 785, 
788–90 (2013) (suggesting mechanisms for improving criminal antitrust enforcement, in-
cluding the use of monitors in the criminal antitrust context). See generally Vikramaditya 
Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor?, in Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Crimi-
nal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct 226, 238–41, 244 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. 
Barkow eds., 2011) (discussing possible reforms for corporate monitors). 
4 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715–20. 
5 Id.; see also Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 682–83; Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, 
at 347–48. 
6 Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 715–24; Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 345–58.  
7 Khanna, supra note 3, at 233–36. 
8 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715. 
9 Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 737. 
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tematic analysis of whether corporate compliance monitors are provid-
ing a function beyond that as an agent of the government and whether 
the current monitorship structure facilitates all of a monitor’s functions. 
This Article begins to fill a gap in the academic literature regarding 
the role of monitorships. Specifically, this Article will undertake a sys-
tematic analysis of the role of the corporate compliance monitor in an 
effort to determine the function provided by a monitor and discern 
whether the common mechanisms for structuring the monitorship rela-
tionship ensure the monitored corporation’s future ethical, regulatory, 
and legal compliance. This analysis will conclude that a corporate com-
pliance monitor is providing a distinct role from other actors in the cor-
porate compliance framework. 
For example, gatekeeping, an important component of the corporate 
governance process, occurs prior to wrongdoing and is an assurance that 
investors and the public should trust that the corporation being assessed 
is acting within appropriate ethical, regulatory, and legal bounds. A cor-
porate compliance monitor is not a gatekeeper. A gatekeeper lends its 
reputational capital to the corporation as a mechanism for signaling to 
investors and the public that the corporation is truthful in its disclo-
sures.10 The gatekeeper is able to fill this role because it is uniquely posi-
tioned within the corporate compliance framework to “prevent wrongdo-
ing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent.”11 In contrast, a 
monitor appears after the compliance failure has occurred to investigate 
the scope of an already identified compliance failure. A monitor is not 
charged with preventing anything directly. It is charged with either rec-
ommending changes the corporation can implement to help prevent fu-
ture misconduct or determining the scope of the identified misconduct 
and the appropriate compensation to those harmed. This function pro-
vided by a monitor also demonstrates why a monitor’s role is dissimilar 
to that of a probation officer. The government does not provide a moni-
tor with a neat list of requirements the corporation must fulfill during the 
monitorship term. Instead, a monitor must investigate the wrongdoing 
identified in the agreement between the government and the corporation 
and make an independent determination regarding what the corporation 
should do to ensure compliance going forward. A monitor creates a 
10 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 2 (2006). 
11 Id. 
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unique set of recommendations based on the corporation’s business op-
erations and the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will provide an overview of 
the traditional use of monitors in the legal system—monitors as agents 
of the court—and the new use of corporate compliance monitors—
monitors as agents of the government. It will then compare corporate 
compliance monitors to other actors within the corporate compliance 
framework to determine what role a monitor is serving. Part II will look 
at the manner in which the relationship structure of monitorships has 
changed over time, demonstrating that a corporate compliance monitor 
may maintain a relationship with a monitored party while also serving in 
its role as government enforcer. The Part next will use recent cases to 
demonstrate the lack of enforceable rules for the parties engaged in 
monitorships. 
This leads to the thesis of this Article, which will be discussed in Part 
III: Corporate compliance monitorships would be more effective if 
structured in a manner that recognizes that one important component of 
a monitor’s function is to act as a legal counselor, and that the legal 
counseling would be more effective within the confines of a relationship 
with binding rules, as opposed to ad hoc standards, regarding confidenti-
ality and information sharing amongst the monitor, corporation, and 
government. The Part will lay out one suggestion for providing just such 
a rule via the creation of a statutory privilege that protects communica-
tions amongst the monitor, corporation, and government, allowing the 
monitorship structure to be reframed as a “monitor-‘client’ relationship.” 
The Part will conclude by discussing the benefits of the proposed 
framework. Part IV will address drawbacks and continued concerns as-
sociated with the Article’s proposals. 
I. THE MONITOR’S ROLE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
For good or for ill, monitors are utilized in a variety of ways within 
the legal system. The traditional role of a monitor is probably best de-
fined as an agent who ensures compliance of a third party on behalf of a 
principal. Essentially, the traditional monitors within the legal system 
have acted as agents of the court by ensuring the parties to the court ac-
tion complied with the relevant court order and corresponding legal and 
regulatory requirements. Corporate compliance monitors are, however, a 
new, different kind of monitor within the legal system. 
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A corporate compliance monitor is currently perceived as an agent of 
the government who assists the government in its efforts to achieve cor-
porate compliance.12 But a comparison of the functions provided by a 
corporate compliance monitor and those of other actors in the corporate 
compliance framework demonstrates that corporate compliance monitors 
are also providing a service to the corporations they “monitor.” This is 
because the corporate compliance monitor is not charged only with mon-
itoring the corporation’s compliance with a predetermined set of re-
quirements. Instead, the corporate compliance monitor is also engaged 
in root-cause analysis. 
The goal of a root-cause analysis is to answer the following questions: 
(1) What happened? (What, exactly, was the ultimate outcome?); 
(2) Why did it happen? (What causal factors contributed to the out-
come?); and (3) What can you do to prevent it from happening again? 
(What system changes can be put in place to anticipate and intervene 
in the errors that inevitably occur in human activities?).13
Root-cause analysis “is intended to counter the tendency among both 
regulators and companies to individualize responsibility.”14 Instead, 
root-cause analysis attempts to systematically determine the cause of the 
structural failure within the firm, so that the firm can implement the pol-
icies and procedures necessary to prevent a similar subsequent failure. 
To effectuate this analysis, the government and the corporation agree by 
providing their express consent to enter into a relationship with the cor-
porate compliance monitor who is charged with conducting this analysis. 
This Part begins by providing examples of the original role of moni-
tors as agents of the court meant to ensure specific performance of court 
orders. The Part then provides a basic overview of a corporate compli-
ance monitorship. It next distinguishes corporate compliance monitors 
12 The Morford Memorandum states that the monitor is not an “agent of the corporation or 
of the Government.” Morford Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4. Despite this language in the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidance, the monitor is still perceived by the public and the 
corporation as the government’s agent and the monitorship agreements are structured to fa-
cilitate a monitor’s role as governmental agent. See infra Part II. 
13 Charles M. Key, Toward a Safer Health System: Medical Injury Compensation and 
Medical Quality, 37 U. Mem. L. Rev. 459, 464 (2007).  
14 William H. Simon, Where Is the “Quality Movement” in Law Practice?, 2012 Wis. L. 
Rev. 387, 397; id. at 395 (noting that “[m]ention of . . . root cause analysis is rare in the legal 
literature on quality management”); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 734–35. 
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from gatekeepers, internal investigators, and court-ordered corporate 
probation. 
A. The Original Monitors 
For many, the description of corporate compliance monitors will re-
mind them of “special masters.”15 For example, in 1981, after it con-
cluded that the Texas Department of Corrections had engaged in cruel 
and unusual punishment of inmates, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas appointed a special master and “several 
monitors” to assist the special master.16 The special master was respon-
sible for “seeing that the district court’s decree [wa]s implemented, and 
empower[ed] him to hold hearings, find facts, and make recommenda-
tions to the district court concerning [the department’s] compliance with 
the decree.”17 In affirming the appointment, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit noted that a special master should be appointed 
“‘only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires’ the ap-
pointment.”18 It went on to explain that “[t]he power of a federal court to 
appoint an agent to supervise the implementation of its decrees has been 
long established” and that “[s]uch court-appointed agents have been 
identified by ‘a confusing plethora of titles: receiver, Master, Special 
Master, master hearing officer, monitor, human rights committee, Om-
budsman,’ and others.”19 Other examples of courts using special masters 
abound, particularly in the context of school desegregation plans20 or in 
15 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715 (discussing the historical underpinnings 
of corporate monitors and relating corporate monitors to the use of special masters, which 
dates back to the early sixteenth century); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683. 
16 Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
id. at 1128 n.13. 
17 Id. at 1159. 
18 Id. at 1160 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b) (amended 2003)). Note that Rule 53 allows for 
the appointment of a special master to perform duties consented to by the parties under three 
circumstances: (1) “some exceptional condition”; (2) when there is a “need to perform an 
accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damages”; or (3) to “address pretrial and 
posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available district 
judge or magistrate judge of the district.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(B)–(C).  
19 Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1161 (emphasis added) (quoting Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special 
Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 784, 
826 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, No. 74-90 TUC DCB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104315, 
at *5–7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13, 2011) (appointing a special master to monitor Tucson United 
School District’s desegregation efforts); Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 
808, 823–25 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (imposing a “compliance monitor” to assist in desegregation 
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general efforts to ensure parties comply with court-ordered injunc-
tions.21
For others, the description of monitors will prompt comparisons to the 
child welfare system. Courts sometimes impose a monitor as part of a 
consent decree requiring a child welfare system to cure deficiencies.22 In 
other circumstances, a court may order the appropriate child welfare 
agency to monitor a child when the parent regains custody.23 For exam-
ple, in Texas a state statute governs “Monitored Return[s] of Child[ren] 
to Parent[s].”24 When a monitored return occurs, the court enters a tem-
porary order requiring the child welfare agency “to continue to serve as 
temporary managing conservator of the child” after the child is returned 
to the parent and to “monitor the child’s placement to ensure that the 
child is in a safe environment.”25 And in other circumstances, courts or-
der a guardian ad litem to monitor the court’s orders regarding child cus-
tody arrangements to ensure the parties’ continued compliance with the 
order.26
In the above scenarios, the monitor is acting as an agent of the court 
by ensuring that the parties adhere to the court order. A monitor does not 
appear to have any concrete duties to the parties other than to report 
truthful and accurate information regarding the parties’ compliance with 
the court order. Because a court-ordered monitor is an agent of the court, 
efforts and describing at length the role of the compliance monitor, including how one 
should be chosen and precisely what the monitor’s duties should be). In Reed v. Cleveland 
Board of Education, 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979), the court appointed an attorney to act as 
the special master and appraise and observe the progress of a school desegregation plan. Be-
cause the lawyer had no previous experience in the field, experts were appointed to assist 
him. Id. at 747–48. When the school board argued that the special master’s fees were unrea-
sonable, the court reduced his hourly rate. Id. at 744–46. 
21 See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 542–45
(9th Cir. 1987); FTC v. John Beck Amazing Profits, No. 2:09-cv-4719-FMC-FFMx, 2009 
WL 7844076, at *15–16 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009). 
22 See, e.g., LaShawn v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2010). The court-appointed 
monitor, the Center for the Study of Social Policy, “kept the Court apprised of the [District 
of Columbia’s] progress and related developments.” Id. In addition, the monitor “assisted the 
parties with negotiations of proposed consent orders and implementation plans.” Id. 
23 See, e.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex. 
App. 2011) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.403 (West 2008)). 
24 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.403 (West 2008). Monitorships are not, however, universal-
ly governed by statutory provisions. 
25 Id. § 263.403(a)(3)–(4). 
26 See, e.g., Buggy v. Buggy, No. FA054005647S, 2010 WL 4723213, at *20 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Oct. 25, 2010) (stating that “[c]lose attention to the implementation of these [child 
custody] orders will be monitored by the Guardian ad Litem”). 
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it is important for a monitor to maintain boundaries between itself and 
the monitored parties.27 It needs to preserve the same sort of independ-
ence that its principal, the court, maintains when dealing with the par-
ties. 
B. Corporate Compliance Monitors 
A corporate compliance monitor is an outsider, most often a lawyer 
but not always, retained after the corporation has been found to have en-
gaged in improper conduct.28 Instead of being imposed on the corpora-
tion like a court-ordered monitor, the government and the corporation 
enter into an agreement that requires the corporation to retain a monitor. 
A corporate compliance monitor serves as an enforcement agent of the 
government.29 But a corporate compliance monitor is also responsible 
for: (1) investigating the extent of the wrongdoing already detected and 
reported to the government; (2) discovering the cause of the corpora-
tion’s compliance failure; and (3) analyzing the corporation’s business 
needs against the appropriate legal and regulatory requirements. A moni-
tor then provides recommendations, to both the corporation and the gov-
ernment, meant to assist the corporation in its efforts to improve its legal 
and regulatory compliance.30 As explained above, this function is analo-
gous to root-cause analysis. Both the government and the corporation 
give consent, per the terms of the agreement, for a corporate compliance 
monitor to engage in this analysis. 
Thus, modern-day corporate compliance monitors are clearly not 
agents of the court.31 In fact, courts often have no participation at all in 
27 See, e.g., Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808, 824 (N.D. Cal. 1985) 
(describing the compliance monitor as “an arm of the court” and “not the agent of either par-
ty”). 
28 See generally Morford Memorandum, supra note 1 (providing guidance regarding the 
utilization, selection, and scope of a monitorship when used in connection with a deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution agreement). 
29 The monitor’s reports are typically provided to both the government and the monitored 
corporation and include (1) “the monitor’s activities” and (2) “whether the [organization] is 
complying with the terms of the agreement.” Id. at 6. 
30 The monitor’s reports also provide any recommended “changes that are necessary to 
foster the [organization’s] compliance.” Id. 
31 Other scholars studying compliance monitors have included court-ordered monitors 
within their analyses. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 684–89. This was certainly part of 
the progression to today’s corporate compliance monitor that results from settlement agree-
ments without formal court involvement, but a court-ordered monitor appears to fulfill a dis-
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the process resulting in the retention of a monitor. If a monitorship is the 
result of a non-prosecution agreement, it never comes before the court. 
And usually the court maintains only cursory approval over monitor-
ships resulting from deferred prosecution agreements.32 It is, however, 
easy to conceive of a monitor as an agent of the government.33 When the 
government finds that a corporation has failed in its self-policing duties, 
the government often introduces the retention of a corporate compliance 
monitor as one of the terms of the settlement agreement between the 
corporation and the government to ensure the corporation’s future com-
pliance with the law. 
Depending on the scope of the investigation into the organization, a 
monitor will often employ a large staff to complete the day-to-day inves-
tigation.34 This staff will often interview individual employees to deter-
mine the status quo within the organization in terms of generally accept-
ed conduct and culture. A monitor’s team will then utilize the gathered 
information to make an assessment regarding the scope, nature, and 
cause of the misconduct within the organization. For example, the cause 
could be a pervasive scheme to systematically bribe foreign officials.35
Once a monitor determines the cause of the misconduct, it turns its at-
tention to recommending mechanisms for the corporation to put in place 
to deter and prevent future misconduct or provide compensation to the 
victims.36 At a minimum, it appears a monitor should ensure that the or-
tinct role from those that are not the result of a court order, so I have purposefully excluded 
them from the scope of monitorships this Article discusses. 
32 See, e.g., United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, 
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (retaining supervisory power over the deferred prosecution 
agreement and noting the novelty of this step by the court). 
33 Corporate criminal misconduct is often difficult to detect. See Jennifer Arlen, Removing 
Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Re-
forms, in Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Con-
duct, supra note 3, at 62, 70. But it is even more difficult for the government to detect mis-
conduct within a corporation. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their 
Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 53, 72 (2007). 
34 Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 370 (noting the importance of hiring a monitor 
who will utilize a team with prior expertise as opposed to a team of novices).  
35 Id. at 331 (detailing “a decade-long scheme of paying bribes to foreign government offi-
cials to obtain contracts with government customers for the purchase of Daimler vehicles” at 
three Daimler AG subsidiaries, and reporting the retention of an independent compliance 
monitor for a three-year term). 
36 See, e.g., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enforcement Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 33 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf (explaining that the government “may 
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ganization has policies and procedures in place that (1) “exercise due 
diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct” and (2) “otherwise 
promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a 
commitment to compliance with the law.”37
While the above sets out the most basic parameters of modern-day 
monitorships, the precise terms of a monitorship are detailed in the set-
tlement agreement between the corporation and the government.38 In 
theory, this allows the government and corporation to tailor the terms of 
the monitorship as necessary to effectuate optimal compliance with the 
law and ethical behavior. Moreover, a monitor’s charge to provide rec-
ommendations that will assist the corporation in its efforts to achieve 
regulatory and legal compliance allows a monitor to provide business-
specific recommendations that are tailored to ensure each individual 
corporation’s success in its compliance efforts.39
C. Functional Comparison of Compliance Actors 
The idea that a monitor is functioning as something more than a gov-
ernmental agent is supported by language in the settlement agreements, 
which suggests that the government intends for the monitor and the cor-
poration to work together in their efforts to ensure a more effective 
compliance regime that will deter and decrease future wrongdoing. For 
example, in May 2013, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Total 
S.A. (“Total”), a French oil and gas company with several U.S. subsidi-
impose a monitorship to ensure that the bribery has ceased and a compliance program is de-
veloped to prevent future misconduct”). 
37 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a)(1)–(2) (2011). These are the factors 
set out in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Guidelines (“Organizational 
Guidelines”) for determining if an organization has an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram that adequately prevents and deters criminal conduct. Thus, the Organizational Guide-
lines set the floor for what is required of corporations, despite not being directly applicable 
to monitorships entered into as a result of deferred or non-prosecution agreements between 
the corporation and the government that occur in a setting where the Organizational Guide-
lines do not apply. 
38 See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 345–46. Monitorships can also be imposed 
as part of a guilty plea. Id. at 329–33 (detailing several specific instances where this was the 
case). 
39 See Lawrence Cunningham, Deferred Prosecution and Corporate Governance: An Inte-
grated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2014) (explaining the 
importance of “prosecutorial consideration of governance when deciding how to proceed 
against a business” and revealing “that prosecutors fail to appreciate how formal uniformity 
in corporate governance regulation masks considerable substantive variation and how this 
failure can be costly”). 
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aries, entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (“Total 
Agreement”) after it was found that Total participated in a scheme to 
make unlawful payments for the benefit of an Iranian official in an effort 
to secure contracts to develop oil fields.40 Total agreed to pay a mone-
tary penalty in the amount of $245.2 million and to retain a “corporate 
compliance monitor” for a three-year term.41 The Total Agreement ex-
plains that in undertaking the monitorship: 
[T]he Monitor is to rely to the extent possible on available information 
and documents provided by Total. It is not intended that the Monitor 
will conduct its own inquiry into those historical events. . . . [T]he 
Monitor is encouraged to coordinate with Total personnel, including 
auditors and compliance personnel. To the extent the Monitor deems 
appropriate, it may rely on Total processes, on the results of studies, 
reviews, audits, and analyses conducted by or on behalf of Total, and 
on sampling and testing methodologies. The Monitor is not expected 
to conduct a comprehensive review of all business lines, all business 
activities, or all markets.42
So the questions become: What is it that a monitor gives the corporation 
that other professionals do not, and what, if anything, does a monitor 
give the government beyond its role as an enforcement agent? In an ef-
fort to discern the function that monitors are providing to the monitored 
corporation, this Part compares the role of a corporate compliance moni-
tor to the roles of other individuals whose functions are, at least in part, 
utilized to ensure long-term compliance: (1) gatekeepers, (2) internal in-
vestigators, and (3) court-ordered corporate probation programs akin to 
probation officers. 
1. Gatekeepers 
While it is not necessarily the case that a corporate compliance moni-
tor has undergone formal legal training—as evidenced by the fact that 
40 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, French Oil and Gas Company, Total, S.A., Charged 
in the United States and France in Connection with an International Bribery Scheme (May 
29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/totalsa/2013-05-29-total-press-
release-final.pdf. 
41 Id. 
42 Deferred Prosecution Agreement attachment D para. 4, United States v. Total, S.A., No. 
1:13-CR-239 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2013) [hereinafter Total Agreement] (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/totalsa/2013-05-29-total-dpa-
filed.pdf. 
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non-lawyers are sometimes utilized as monitors43—a corporate compli-
ance monitor, much like a corporate attorney, compliance personnel, and 
many times a financial auditor, provides legal, regulatory, and business 
advice. The settlement agreements dictating the terms of monitorships 
typically require the selected monitor to have expertise in the relevant 
legal and regulatory area.44 In addition, a monitor must be able to under-
stand the monitored corporation’s business in order to provide the best 
counsel as to how the corporation can prevent future improper conduct 
while conducting its business operations.45 Thus, a corporate compliance 
monitor is providing many of the same services that traditional gate-
keepers provide. 
The position of a monitor, however, differs from that occupied by a 
gatekeeper. A gatekeeper must be able and willing to “prevent miscon-
duct reliably, regardless of the preferences and market alternatives of 
wrongdoers.”46 The gatekeeper must remain abreast of what the corpora-
tion is doing so that it can actively prevent wrongdoing, and the gate-
keeper must be willing to alert others when misconduct is found.47 As 
Professor Sung Hui Kim has demonstrated, certain gatekeepers are bet-
ter situated to prevent wrongdoing than others and certain gatekeepers 
are likely more willing to sound the alarm to wrongdoing. For example, 
in-house counsel is better situated to actively observe the business ac-
tivities that could result in legal or regulatory violations than outside 
counsel because in-house counsel is actively engaged in the day-to-day 
43 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) required Total to retain 
a monitor, specifically referred to in SEC documents as an “independent compliance con-
sultant,” who was either a French national, law firm, or accounting firm “with demonstrated 
ability in helping companies comply with the FCPA.” Total, S.A., Exchange Act Release 
No. 69,654, [2013 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,307, at 85,532 (May 29, 
2013). 
44 See, e.g., Total Agreement, supra note 42, at attachment D para. 1 (dictating that Total 
“agrees to engage an independent compliance monitor . . . with demonstrated expertise in 
helping companies comply with the [FCPA] . . . and other applicable anti-corruption laws”); 
see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1736 (noting that “monitors . . . are chosen 
primarily for their expertise in law compliance”). 
45 Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 370 (“It is important for any lawyer to under-
stand the business of his or her corporate client, but the relevance of this element of an effec-
tive legal representation is significantly amplified in the monitorship context.”). 
46 Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 411, 416 (2008) (quot-
ing Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strate-
gy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 61 (1986)). 
47 Id. at 416–17. 
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decision making at the corporation.48 In-house counsel is, however, more 
vulnerable to being resistant to alerting others to wrongdoing because 
alerting others may have repercussions for the in-house counsel’s own 
work environment.49 And both in-house and outside counsel must care-
fully balance their obligations to report misconduct with their obliga-
tions to their clients, which may create a situation where private attor-
neys err on the side of not reporting when close calls occur.50 An 
auditor-gatekeeper is able to both actively observe and sound an alarm 
without the conflicts lawyers face because auditors are by necessity con-
sidered independent from the corporation.51
A monitor, however, is largely free from a gatekeeper’s limitations. A 
corporate compliance monitor knows wrongdoing has already occurred; 
the goal of a monitorship is not to find additional wrongdoing,52 but to 
provide counsel to the corporation on how to avoid future wrongdoing. 
As such, a monitor is not concerned with being fired as a result of re-
porting a violation, and the monitorship is structured in a way that pro-
vides a monitor full access to the corporation for the duration of the 
monitorship term. Thus, a monitor has the benefit of constant interaction 
with the corporation’s members and intimate familiarity with its busi-
ness operations. However, a monitor is also subject to some of the limi-
tations associated with auditor-gatekeepers in that personnel within the 
corporation may be hesitant to volunteer information to an actor known 
not to (1) owe confidentiality obligations to the corporation nor 
(2) operate under the shield of privilege. 
48 Id. at 417, 451. 
49 Id. at 418, 439–41. 
50 See Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeep-
ing, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 129, 132–33 (2011). 
51 But see id. at 140–41 (discussing how some lawyers argue that accountants are “too 
close to business and not sufficiently independent from client influence” while the bar char-
acterized “accountants as independent ‘public watchdogs’ during the debates over Sarbanes-
Oxley § 307”). 
52 That is not to say that the monitor will hide wrongdoing if it is discovered. The monitor 
is typically required to report any additional violations found to the government, but the 
monitor is not supposed to be looking for those violations. See Warin, Diamant & Root, su-
pra note 1, at 354 (discussing an instance where a monitor discovered potential wrongdoing 
and alerted the DOJ to its findings). 
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2. Internal Investigators 
A monitor’s function also differs from that of a lawyer charged with 
conducting an internal investigation. It is relatively common for a corpo-
ration to run its own internal investigation when it finds that wrongdoing 
may have occurred.53 Such investigations are often led by a team of in-
house and outside counsel and increasingly involve compliance person-
nel as well. The purpose of the investigation is almost always to provide 
legal advice to the corporation, which places the investigation within the 
bounds of the attorney-client privilege.54 And when an investigation is 
undertaken for the express purpose of determining the scope and nature 
of wrongdoing, attorneys do not have a reporting obligation, either with-
in (for example, up-the-ladder reporting) or outside (for example, report-
ing to the government) the organization, under the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (“Model Rules”).55 The primary purpose of an internal 
investigation is to provide legal advice on how to deal with the legal or 
regulatory failure. Assuring future compliance with the law is a second-
ary concern. Such corporate internal investigations are “regarded by the 
law as private employment matters in which the government has no part, 
[and thus] they are essentially unregulated by legal protections and un-
monitored by courts as they occur.”56
53 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 
1785–86 (2011) (noting that the board of directors for “Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (‘Sie-
mens’), a German multinational corporation, . . . decided to conduct a massive internal in-
vestigation [with] Siemens spen[ding] over $500 million investigating the case,” including 
“hundreds of millions of dollars” spent on outside counsel). 
54 See Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving 
Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 73, 75–76 (2013) (“[L]awyers are often 
an integral part of the internal investigation because their participation enables the corpora-
tion to claim attorney-client and work-product protections for the results of the investiga-
tion.”). 
55 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(d) (2013); see also Barry R. Temkin & Ben 
Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Eth-
ical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, N.Y. St. B.A. J., Ju-
ly/Aug. 2012, at 10, 17–18 (“Under ABA Model Rule 1.13, a corporate lawyer with 
knowledge of wrongdoing that poses a substantial risk of injury to the organization must re-
port the violation up the corporate ladder. . . . If the corporation’s board fails to address in a 
timely and appropriate manner an action, . . . that is clearly a violation of law. If the lawyer 
reasonably believes that the violation is ‘reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to 
the organization,’ then the lawyer may (but is not obligated to) report outside the corpora-
tion . . . but only to the extent necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.”). 
56 Green & Podgor, supra note 54, at 77. 
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In contrast, a monitor most often arrives after an internal investigation 
has occurred—after the scope of improper conduct has been fully inves-
tigated and confirmed as part of the process necessary to obtain an 
agreement between the government and the corporation. A monitor is 
not charged with providing legal advice regarding the prior violation and 
how best to deal with it. Instead, a monitor counsels the corporation on 
how to ensure that its future business conduct complies with legal and 
regulatory requirements. Unlike lawyers conducting an internal investi-
gation, a monitor provides advice that is both outside the bounds of the 
traditional attorney-client relationship and under the auspices of gov-
ernment mandate and control. 
3. Court-Ordered Corporate Probation 
Under the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Guidelines 
(“Organizational Guidelines”), a court may impose probation on a cor-
poration that pleads guilty to legal violations.57 As the Organizational 
Guidelines explain, sanctions are imposed upon organizations to ensure 
“just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations 
to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting 
criminal conduct.”58 “[P]robation is an appropriate sentence for an or-
ganizational defendant when needed to ensure that another sanction will 
be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the or-
ganization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”59 If im-
posed, the probation term is typically one to five years and includes the 
condition that the organization not commit another crime during the 
probation term.60 The sanction must also include either restitution or 
community service,61 and it may include other conditions that the court 
believes “are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense or the history and characteristics of the organization” and “in-
57 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.1 (2012); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Hu-
manization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the 
Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 15–18 (2010). If the conduct is egregious 
enough, the corporation could be sanctioned under § 8C1.1, which requires the dissolution of 
the organization. See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 334. 
58 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2012). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. §§ 8D1.2(a), 8D1.3(a). 
61 Id. § 8D1.3(b). 
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volve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are necessary to 
effect the purposes of sentencing.”62
Thus, a corporation is at the mercy of court-ordered probation if it has 
pleaded guilty to the violation and probation is needed to prevent the or-
ganization from future wrongdoing.63 This is very similar to the reasons 
for which the government agrees to the corporation’s retention of a mon-
itor. Both a corporate probation program and a monitorship are con-
cerned with ensuring the corporation’s long-term legal and regulatory 
compliance.64 The major difference is the court’s involvement. A corpo-
rate probation program necessitates court involvement and functions on 
behalf of the court. In contrast, a corporate compliance monitor often 
has little to no interaction with the court and serves as an agent of the 
government. 
Court-ordered corporate probation does not include engaging in the 
same sort of root-cause analysis that a corporate compliance monitor 
provides. While court-ordered probation merely places the corporation 
on watch to see if it complies with legal and regulatory requirements, a 
62 Id. § 8D1.3(c).  
63 If a corporation is a recidivist, the Organizational Guidelines state that a “court may ex-
tend the term of probation, impose more restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke proba-
tion and resentence the organization.” Id. § 8F1.1. The commentary to § 8F1.1 states that 
“[i]n the event of repeated violations of conditions of probation, the appointment of a master 
or trustee may be appropriate to ensure compliance with court orders.” Id. § 8F1.1 cmt. n.1. 
Note, however, that a master or trustee would seem to have more control over the corpora-
tion’s actions than a court-ordered monitor similar to the corporate compliance monitors uti-
lized in agreements between the government and corporation. The trustee or master could 
actually force the corporation to take certain actions, while the court-ordered monitor would 
be imposed to ensure the corporation is complying with the terms of probation as outlined by 
the court’s order. In 2010, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued proposed amendments to 
the Organizational Guidelines that would have required the appointment of an independent 
corporate monitor as a condition of probation for the organization, but this requirement was 
not incorporated into the final version. See Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 75 Fed. Reg. 3534, 3535 (Jan. 21, 2010); Sheyn, supra note 57, at 16–18 (discussing 
proposed amendments to the Organizational Guidelines, including the requirement of an in-
dependent corporate monitor). Despite the rejection of this proposed amendment, the Organ-
izational Guidelines continue to allow the court to engage “experts” to assist the probation 
officers and the courts in determining whether the corporation is complying with the terms of 
probation. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.4(b)(5) (2012). 
64 I have purposefully left court-ordered monitors outside my definition of a corporate 
compliance monitor because I think there is a substantive difference between a monitor im-
posed upon a corporation and a monitor the corporation agrees to retain. The distinction is, 
admittedly, subtle in that the government arguably has strong coercive powers that enable it 
to induce the corporation to agree to the monitorship, but I believe it is still a distinction 
worth preserving for the purposes of this Article.  
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corporate compliance monitor assists the corporation in these efforts. A 
portion of a monitor’s role is as a partner to the corporation in its efforts 
to ensure long-term compliance. 
II. THE MONITORSHIP’S STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS
Whether a corporate compliance monitor actually necessitates com-
plete independence from the monitored party to effectuate the goals of 
monitorship remains an open question. Instead, it may be the case that a 
monitor is serving as an agent to both the government and the monitored 
corporation, which is permissible if both coprincipals—in this case the 
government and the monitored corporation—consent.65 A review of 
monitorship structures over time suggests that a corporate compliance 
monitor may maintain a relationship with the monitored party while also 
serving in its role as government enforcer. 
A. Monitorship Relationship Structures over Time 
As explained above, each monitorship has the potential to be entirely 
unique because the overarching structure and parameters of a monitor-
ship are determined by the terms of the agreement between the govern-
ment and the corporation. This creates a challenge in attempting to pro-
vide a generic description of monitorships. This Section uses FCPA 
agreements as an illustration of how monitorship structures have 
changed. The FCPA is a valuable case study because, for the past ten 
years, monitorships have routinely been a part of agreements between 
the DOJ and corporations found to have engaged in behavior violating 
the FCPA.66 Thus, this context, at a minimum, provides constants in 
terms of one of the parties—the DOJ—and the underlying violation—an 
illegal payment under the FCPA—which allow relatively consistent 
points of comparison across monitorship terms. 
When the DOJ began its aggressive enforcement of the FCPA in 
2004, it was not unusual for the agreements to anticipate a situation in 
which a monitor and the corporation might enter into a privileged rela-
tionship. If a privileged relationship did occur, the settlement agreement 
65 See Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 3.14(b), 3.16, 8.06(2) (2006).  
66 Lee G. Dunst, Avoiding and Navigating Compliance Monitorships, Anti-Corruption 
Committee News (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div., London, U.K.), Sept. 2013, at 50, 50, 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Dunst-IBA-Newsletter-
Compliance-Monitorships.pdf. 
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required that the corporation waive the privilege as to the government 
and that the sharing of such communications would not prevent the cor-
poration from asserting its right of privilege against third parties at-
tempting to access the information. 
For example, in 2004, the DOJ entered into a non-prosecution agree-
ment with InVision Technologies (“InVision”).67 The InVision non-
prosecution agreement stated: 
It shall be a condition of the Monitor’s retention that the Monitor is 
independent of InVision and that no attorney-client relationship shall 
be formed between them. If InVision, the Monitor or any other party 
or tribunal asserts or determines that communications between the 
Monitor and InVision are protected by the attorney-client privilege or 
that documents created or reviewed by InVision or the Monitor in 
connection with the Monitor’s work are protected by the work product 
doctrine, then InVision shall waive only as to the DOJ and the SEC 
any protections afforded to such communications and documents. Any 
revocation of these waivers shall constitute a breach of this Agree-
ment. The sharing of such communications by the Monitor with the 
DOJ and the SEC is not intended to constitute a waiver of any privi-
lege under any federal or state law that would shield from disclosure 
to any other third party any such communications.68
Interestingly, this agreement, like others reached during this time pe-
riod, started with the premise that the monitor would remain independ-
ent, but the monitor was required to be a “law firm” per the language of 
the agreement.69 As such, it would seem the government might have 
foreseen that the law firm would provide legal advice to the corporation, 
which was required to “retain and pay” for the firm per the terms of the 
agreement, as well as the possibility that an attorney-client relationship 
67 See Non-Prosecution Agreement (as to InVision Technologies, Inc.), In re InVision Techs. 
(Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/
12-03-04invisiontech-agree.pdf. InVision’s agents or distributors in Thailand, China, and the 
Philippines paid or offered money to foreign officials in connection with the sale of In-
Vision’s airport security screening machines. Id. para. 1. 
68 Id. para. 11. 
69 See, e.g., Non-Prosecution Agreement para. 11, In re Micrus Corp. (Feb. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/micrus-corp/02-28-05micrus-
agree.pdf (including language similar to the InVision agreement about the lack of an attor-
ney-client privilege between the monitor and the company). 
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might be understood to follow.70 The government appeared concerned 
primarily with its ability to access the material provided to and created 
by the monitor and less concerned, at least in theory, with the corpora-
tion and the lawyer-monitor engaging in a privileged relationship. But 
the idea of selective waiver has been widely rejected by courts and even-
tually disappeared from the settlement agreement language.71
Over the next few years, different types of monitorship structures 
were evidenced in settlement agreements between the government and 
corporations found to have engaged in violations of the FCPA. First, the 
agreements regularly stated that a condition of the retention of the moni-
tor was that “no attorney-client relationship shall be formed between 
them.”72 Second, the agreements provided detailed instructions regard-
ing the development of the work plan for the monitorship. If disputes 
arose regarding the work plan—the plan for conducting the monitorship 
process—they were to be elevated to the DOJ for its determination as to 
how the monitorship should proceed. For example, the deferred prosecu-
tion agreement in United States v. Statoil (“Statoil Agreement”)73 states 
the following: 
In order to conduct an effective initial review and to fully understand 
any existing deficiencies in controls, policies and procedures related to 
the FCPA, the [Monitor’s] initial work plan shall include such steps as 
are necessary to develop an understanding of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the violations described in the attached Statement 
70 Id. 
71 The federal courts of appeals have been split for over two decades regarding the efficacy 
of selective waiver when done as part of voluntary cooperation with a government investiga-
tion. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 320–22 (5th ed. 
2010). In addition, attempts to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence to include a provision 
permitting selective waiver failed. See Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or Damnation? 
Proposed New Federal Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 129, 129, 133–
34 (2007). 
72 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement para. 11, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 
06-CR-960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Statoil Agreement], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-09-06statoil-agree.pdf. 
As demonstrated by SEC v. American International Group, 854 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 
2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013), however, the government sometimes makes 
attempts to keep the contents of monitorships confidential. See infra Section II.B. But these 
assurances of confidentiality, even when guaranteed by court order, are anything but defini-
tive. 
73 Statoil allegedly paid more than $5 million to an Iranian official to access one of the 
world’s largest natural gas fields. Statoil Agreement, supra note 72, at app. A at 1. 
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of Facts. Any disputes between STATOIL and the [Monitor] with re-
spect to the work plan shall be decided by DOJ in its sole discretion.74
But the agreements between the DOJ and the corporations deferred 
much of the decision making and authority to the monitor. For example, 
the Statoil Agreement stated that: “STATOIL shall cooperate fully with 
the [Monitor]. The [Monitor] shall have the authority to take such rea-
sonable steps, in the [Monitor’s] view, as necessary to be fully informed 
about the operations of STATOIL within the scope of his or her respon-
sibilities under this Agreement.”75 Obviously, this created a situation 
where the corporation became subject to the monitor’s direction and in-
struction. And, in subsequent years, the monitor’s power was memorial-
ized in even stronger terms.76 For example, in the deferred prosecution 
agreement between the DOJ and Aibel Group (“Aibel”), the agreement 
continued to state that disputes between the monitor and the corporation 
“with respect to the work plan shall be decided by the [DOJ] in its sole 
discretion,”77 but it also provided the monitor with an ability to make 
sweeping decisions regarding the ultimate recommendations that the 
corporation must implement going forward. 
With respect to any recommendation that [Aibel] consider[s] unduly 
burdensome, impractical, or costly, [Aibel] need not adopt that rec-
ommendation within that time but shall propose in writing an alterna-
tive policy, procedure or system designed to achieve the same objec-
tive or purpose. As to any recommendation on which [Aibel] and [the 
monitor] do not agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach 
an agreement within thirty (30) calendar days after [Aibel] serve[s] the 
written advice. In the event [Aibel] and [the monitor] are unable to 
agree on an alternative proposal, [Aibel] shall abide by the determi-
nations of [the monitor].78
74 Id. para. 12. 
75 Id. para. 11. 
76 It is not clear what caused this change, although the time in which monitorships were 
becoming more onerous corresponded with the government, in 2006, having to scale back its 
aggressive stance on requiring corporations to waive privilege to obtain leniency. See infra 
note 132. 
77 Deferred Prosecution Agreement para. 13, United States v. Aibel Grp., No. 07-CR-005 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
aibelgrp/02-06-07aibelgrp-agree.pdf. 
78 Id. para. 15 (emphasis added).  
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This language provided the monitor with even greater authority over the 
corporation and largely left the corporation without recourse if it disa-
greed with the monitor’s recommendations.79 Perhaps unsurprisingly, it 
appears that granting this level of authority to the monitor was unsuc-
cessful. A little over a year into the three-year monitorship, Aibel ceased 
the monitorship and entered a guilty plea.80 The monitorship agreements 
entered into between the DOJ and corporations for FCPA violations 
since Aibel entered its guilty plea no longer contain language requiring 
the corporation to adhere to the monitor’s recommendations,81 and the 
Morford Memorandum, which was issued after the Aibel guilty plea, 
memorialized a corporation’s right to choose not to adopt the monitor’s 
recommendations.82
For example, the recent Total Agreement states: 
With respect to any recommendation Total considers unduly burden-
some, inconsistent with local or other applicable law or regulation, 
impractical, unduly expensive, or otherwise inadvisable, Total need 
not adopt that recommendation . . . but shall propose in writing to the 
Monitor an alternative policy, procedure, or system designed to 
achieve the same objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on 
which Total and the Monitor do not agree, the parties shall attempt in 
79 Professors Khanna and Dickinson would likely classify these types of monitorship struc-
tures as more “influential monitors,” or monitors “more similar to the top management of a 
firm.” Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1731. These monitors had a great deal of deci-
sion-making power. 
80 Plea Agreement para. 1, Aibel Grp., No. 07-CR-005, available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aibelgrp/11-21-08aibelgrp-plea.pdf. Aibel agreed to pay a fine of 
$4.2 million and serve a two-year term of organizational probation. Under the terms of pro-
bation, Aibel agreed not to commit another crime, to submit written reports to the court if 
required, and to pay a mandatory special assessment to the clerk of court. Id. para. 19. 
81 Thus, the agreements after the Aibel plea no longer look like the more “influential moni-
tors” as described by Khanna and Dickinson. See supra note 79. The Aibel plea noted that 
Aibel had entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ that required the 
company to “(1) establish a Compliance Committee of its Board of Directors; (2) engage 
outside compliance counsel to monitor its duties and obligations under the [deferred prosecu-
tion agreement]; and, (3) establish and effectively implement a compliance program.” Plea 
Agreement, supra note 80, para. 20(a). The agreement noted that “[Aibel] has committed 
substantial time, personnel, and resources to meeting the obligations of the [deferred prose-
cution agreement]. Despite that fact, [Aibel] has failed to meet its obligations.” Id. This lan-
guage, when looked at in light of the future agreements that lessened the authority of moni-
tors, suggests that the corporate compliance monitor retained by Aibel created a monitorship 
that was too onerous for the company to continue to engage in and it instead decided to enter 
a guilty plea. 
82 Morford Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6. 
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good faith to reach an agreement . . . . In the event Total and the Moni-
tor are unable to agree on an acceptable alternative proposal, Total 
shall promptly consult with the [DOJ], which will make a determina-
tion as to whether Total should adopt the Monitor’s recommendation 
or an alternative proposal, and Total shall abide by that determina-
tion. During the time period in which a [DOJ] determination is pend-
ing, Total shall not be required to implement any contested recom-
mendation.83
Currently, the government continues to prohibit a privileged relation-
ship between the corporation and a monitor, and the most recent agree-
ments have expanded the prohibitory language outside the traditional 
confines of the attorney-client privilege.84 The Total Agreement states 
that “[t]he parties agree that the retention of the Monitor does not estab-
lish an attorney-client, auditor-client, or similar relationship between To-
tal and the Monitor.”85 In addition, the agreements often state that a 
monitor must have “sufficient independence from [the corporation] to 
ensure effective and impartial performance of the Monitor’s duties as 
described in the Agreement.”86 But the newer agreements also attempt to 
maintain a great deal of confidentiality regarding a monitor’s investiga-
tion, similar to the confidentiality the government attempted to achieve 
in the case involving American International Group (“AIG”). The Total 
Agreement attempts to keep the monitor’s reports confidential, stating: 
The [Monitor’s] reports will likely include proprietary, financial, con-
fidential, and competitive business information. Moreover, public dis-
closure of the reports could discourage cooperation, impede pending 
or potential government investigations and thus undermine the objec-
tives of the Monitorship. For these reasons, among others, the reports 
and the contents thereof are intended to remain and shall remain non-
public, except . . . to the extent that the [DOJ] determines in its sole 
discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the [DOJ]’s dis-
charge of its duties and responsibilities or is otherwise required by 
law.87
83 Total Agreement, supra note 42, at attachment D paras. 5–6 (emphasis added). 
84 See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 353–54.  
85 Total Agreement, supra note 42, at attachment D para. 2. 
86 Id. para. 10(d). 
87 Id. at attachment D para. 3 (emphasis added). 
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Looking at the monitorship structures as set out in the settlement 
agreements over time reveals three insights. First, the government wants 
unfettered access to the information gathered by the monitor. Second, 
the government is relatively ambivalent as to whether others have access 
to this information. The government wants a monitor to provide it with 
enough information so that the government is assured that wrongdoing 
will not occur in the future, but it has traditionally acknowledged that 
public dissemination of these reports is not an integral part of the pro-
cess of decreasing future wrongdoing. Third, the monitorship structure is 
determined on an ad hoc basis without enforceable rules governing items 
such as the nature of the relationship between the monitor and the corpo-
ration and whether the monitor’s reports will remain confidential. Inter-
estingly, court-ordered confidentiality is similarly lacking in clear rules 
for parties engaged in a monitorship. 
B. Limitations with Current Monitorship Structure 
The above review of monitorship structures found in FCPA settle-
ment agreements demonstrates that monitorships currently function un-
der a system of ad hoc standards that may vary from agreement to 
agreement. There is a debate on whether deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements are properly considered contracts, regulation, or a mecha-
nism of prosecutorial discretion.88 Regardless of their classification, 
however, they do not qualify as bright-line rules that provide parties en-
tering into monitorships a binding set of norms upon which they can re-
ly. Interestingly, when parties to a monitorship attempt to protect their 
agreed-upon understanding of the terms of the monitorship, even court-
ordered protection is insufficient under the current system. 
For example, in 2004, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia was asked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
and AIG to enter a consent order issuing a final judgment against AIG 
regarding improper accounting and financial reporting.89 As part of the 
terms of the consent order, AIG agreed to “retain an independent con-
sultant . . . to review . . . policies and procedures as well as all transac-
tions that AIG entered into between January 1, 2000, and the date of the 
Final Judgment and that had ‘a primary purpose of enabling a Reporting 
88 See Cunningham, supra note 39, at 41–49. 
89 SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1, 5 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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Company to obtain an accounting or financial reporting result.’”90 The 
purpose of the review was to determine whether past transactions “were 
used or designed to permit counter-parties to violate generally accepted 
accounting principles (‘GAAP’) or rules promulgated by the SEC.”91
Once the independent consultant concluded his review, he was required 
to provide reports of his findings (“Monitor Reports”) to the SEC, the 
DOJ, and AIG’s internal audit committee. Any reasonable recommenda-
tions made by the independent consultant were to be implemented by 
AIG. On June 14, 2006, the SEC and AIG filed a motion to have the 
Monitor Reports prohibited from being subject to public dissemination.92
The rationale was that the parties intended the information provided by 
AIG to the independent consultant to be kept confidential from anyone 
other than the entities identified in the consent decree—in other words, 
only the SEC, DOJ, and independent consultant were to have access to 
the information provided by AIG. The court granted the motion, thereby 
leading the parties to believe that their communications would remain 
confidential.93
Five years later, in January 2011, a reporter tried to gain access to the 
Monitor Reports. The reporter first filed a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request with the DOJ, which stated that it could not locate the 
Monitor Reports.94 The reporter then tried to obtain the Monitor Reports 
from the SEC, which referred the reporter to the court’s order restricting 
dissemination of the Monitor Reports. Ultimately, the reporter filed a 
“Motion to Intervene for Access to Monitor’s Reports,” arguing that the 
Monitor Reports must be made publicly available based on “(1) a First 
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and (2) a common 
law right of access to judicial records.”95 On April 16, 2012, the same 
district court that had issued the order granting confidentiality to the 
Monitor Reports determined that: (1) the reports were judicial records; 
(2) the interests of the public weighed in favor of requiring disclosure of 
the reports; and (3) redacted Monitor Reports must be made available to 
the public.96
90 Id. at 78. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 79. 
96 Id. at 81–83. 
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Now imagine the implications of a ruling like the one just described 
for the corporation and the lawyers in the case. The corporation intended 
for the information to remain confidential and may have been advised by 
its representative-lawyer that the confidentiality would likely be upheld 
after the court order in June 2006. But confidentiality does not have the 
gravitas of an evidentiary privilege and the reporter was able to make 
relatively simple arguments to overcome the order of confidentiality by 
the district court. Thus, from the perspective of the corporation, the ad-
vice from its representative-lawyer now looks to be suspect. Further-
more, the monitor in the case was an attorney,97 and he likely believed 
that his actions and reports were to remain confidential. But attorneys 
acting as monitors are not engaged in an attorney-client relationship—
again, no evidentiary privilege applies.98 Moreover, a lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality applies only to “clients,” and since AIG was not properly 
considered a client of the monitor, no ethical duty attached despite the 
parties’ intent and attempt to formalize the confidential relationship. In 
other words, the lawyers in this case intended a confidential relationship 
in 2004 and believed they were involved in a confidential relationship in 
2006, only to have that belief shattered by legal maneuvering in 2012. 
The district court’s decision was ultimately overturned by the D.C. 
Circuit, which found that the reports were “not judicial records subject 
to the right of access because the district court made no decisions about 
them or that otherwise relied on them.”99 Unfortunately, the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s opinion provides little comfort to those hoping for predictability 
regarding confidentiality when entering monitorships because the opin-
ion was quite fact-specific. Moreover, a district court recently approved 
a deferred prosecution agreement with the appointment of a compliance 
monitor but retained supervisory power over the agreement’s implemen-
tation and directed the government to furnish quarterly reports to the 
97 The first independent consultant in the case was James Cole, now Deputy Attorney 
General of the United States, and the second independent consultant was Therese Pritchard, 
a partner at Bryan Cave. See Brief for the Appellee at 7, SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5141). 
98 At best, the lawyer-monitor would likely be classified as engaging in “third-party neu-
tral” conduct under the Model Rules, which provides little guidance regarding how attorneys 
must comport themselves when undertaking matters of this type. Model Rules of Prof’l Con-
duct R. 2.4(a) (2013). 
99 Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d at 3–4. The court distinguished AIG’s monitor from that of a 
court-ordered monitor. Id. at 4. The opinion explained that “nothing in the record suggests 
the district court cared a whit about the results of the independent consultant’s investigation 
as long as AIG in fact initiated the investigation.” Id. 
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court over the five years that the case will be pending.100 The order like-
ly makes the reports judicial records, which would be subject to public 
dissemination. Because there are no binding rules governing monitor-
ships, the court was well within its authority to issue this ruling even 
while it “recognize[d] that the exercise of supervisory power in this con-
text is novel.”101 Thus, corporations and the government may come into 
future agreements regarding the nature and scope of a monitorship, but 
may encounter a judge who believes, quite possibly rightly, that the 
court has a responsibility to oversee these sorts of agreements. This 
could very well cause the parties’ agreements to be put aside in favor of 
the individual judge’s wishes.102
C. Standards Are Not Enough 
The upshot is that the parties faced with retaining a corporate compli-
ance monitor—who provides services to both the corporation and the 
government—are forced to take a major gamble in a world without rules 
governing monitorships. Assurances of confidentiality, or even the terms 
of monitorship, are worth very little under the current monitorship struc-
ture, which is based on unenforceable standards found in agreements be-
tween the government and corporation. Given the increased use of moni-
torships over the past decade and the likelihood that they will remain an 
important part of corporate compliance frameworks, it would seem ap-
propriate to develop a set of enforceable rules regarding the nature of the 
relationship amongst the monitor, government, and corporation that will 
allow parties considering the retention of a corporate compliance moni-
tor, as well as the lawyers involved in monitorships, the ability to enter 
into a monitorship with an informed sense of what the monitorship will 
entail and what potential risks and liabilities are associated with retain-
ing a corporate compliance monitor. 
100 See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
101 Id. at *6. 
102 There are scholars, like Professor Brandon Garrett, who would very much like to see 
courts overseeing all monitorships. See Morford Memorandum Morphed: Who Picks the 
Corporate Monitors?, Corp. Crime Rep., Jan. 7, 2013, at 7, 8, available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/whopicksthemontiors01012013/. 
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III. THE MONITOR-“CLIENT” RELATIONSHIP
As currently structured, monitorships are not designed to maximize 
the success of all aspects of a monitor’s role. A monitor provides a 
unique function within the corporate compliance framework and moni-
torships need a specified system of rules that parties subject to monitor-
ships can rely upon when making the decision to enter into a monitor-
ship. This Article is not suggesting that these rules need to be expansive. 
In fact, it may be that overly expansive rules would harm one of a moni-
torship’s greatest assets—the flexibility to provide company-specific 
counseling on the steps the monitored corporation should implement to 
ensure long-term legal and regulatory compliance.103
Instead, this Article argues that because corporate compliance moni-
tors are engaged in what is essentially legal counseling when they pro-
vide recommendations to the corporation, the structure of monitorships 
should take into account the best mechanisms for facilitating this legal 
counseling.104 A monitor is a highly skilled individual who has primary 
responsibility for counseling the monitored corporation about the legal 
ramifications of its business decisions. Regardless of professional status 
or title, a monitor at a minimum provides legal counsel to the monitored 
corporation.105 Yet a monitor’s role as a legal counselor has been under-
valued by the emphasis placed on a monitor’s role as a governmental en-
forcement agent. Instead, a monitor’s dual functions should be assigned 
equal importance in an effort to achieve the actual goal of a monitor-
ship—which is ensuring future legal and regulatory compliance over the 
long term. 
This Part argues that structuring monitorships so that the monitor en-
ters into a formal relationship with both the government and the corpora-
103 See generally Cunningham, supra note 39, at 1 (arguing that “[i]ntegrating the role of 
corporate governance into prosecutions would promote public confidence in prosecutorial 
decisions to broker firm-specific governance reforms currently lacking and increase their 
effectiveness” (emphasis added)). 
104 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1731 (noting that “monitors may inform 
management that certain plans are not compliant with the law and others are”). 
105 There is an inherent tension here regarding the provision of legal counsel by an indi-
vidual who is not a lawyer and whether that would constitute the unauthorized practice of 
law. The reality is, however, that the legal counseling provided by the monitor is not pure 
legal advice. It is advice that takes into account both the corporation’s business realities and 
the relevant legal and regulatory requirements and then provides what is essentially a mix of 
business and legal advice as to the policies and procedures the monitored corporation should 
implement going forward. This makes parsing the legal and business advice provided by the 
monitor incredibly difficult.  
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tion is necessary due to the monitor’s role as a legal counselor to both 
parties. The Part next proposes a new framework for conceptualizing 
and designing monitorships and explains why adopting a statutory privi-
lege protecting the monitor-client relationship would be a beneficial 
strategy for establishing predictable rules governing monitorships. The 
Part then discusses benefits associated with the proposed framework, in-
cluding increased stability for the private lawyers involved with moni-
torships as well as more consistent norms within corporate compliance 
efforts. 
A. Monitors as Legal Counselors 
To understand the concept of being a legal counselor, it may be help-
ful to think about two of the traditional roles that lawyers undertake on 
behalf of clients. One role is that of an advocate and the other is that of 
an advisor. The now-superseded Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility distinguished the two roles as follows: “In asserting a position on 
behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals with past conduct 
and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as 
adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course of future 
conduct and relationships.”106 In other words, an advocate makes an ar-
gument on behalf of a client’s position.107 An advocate assists the client 
in asserting a course of conduct that the client believes to be beneficial. 
As such, the lawyer as advocate typically has an adversary—someone 
on the other side arguing in favor of the contrary position. 
But an advisor is someone who looks prospectively—who attempts to 
advise the client as to the best course of action. In his work discussing 
the lawyer’s role as a counselor, Professor Thomas Morgan argued, in 
part, that a lawyer acting as counselor should provide “professional 
judgment and advice to a client” that “reflect the empathy, respect, and 
practical wisdom that the lawyer would offer a good friend.”108 Similar-
ly, the Model Rules explain that an advisor is to provide “straightfor-
ward advice expressing the lawyer’s honest assessment.”109 The lawyer 
106 Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 439, 440–
41 (1990) (quoting Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-3 (1980)). 
107 Thus, a lawyer seeking an exemption from the SEC on behalf of a client would be con-
sidered an advocate. That same lawyer might be acting as an advisor when discussing the 
ramifications of requesting such an exemption with the client. 
108 Id. at 445. 
109 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2013). 
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acting as an advisor does not advocate a particular position and is not 
paired up against an adversary; the lawyer as advisor is providing a cli-
ent wise counsel. 
A monitor is charged with providing a similar type of advice as the 
lawyer-advisor. Once a monitor has completed its investigation—its 
root-cause analysis—a monitor is charged with providing recommenda-
tions to both the corporation and the government regarding the changes 
the corporation needs to incorporate into its compliance efforts to im-
prove future legal and regulatory compliance. These recommendations 
are tailored to the specific needs of the corporation’s business, but they 
are based on legal and regulatory compliance. Yet, as currently struc-
tured, monitorships provide no mechanism of enforceable protection that 
encourages “full and frank” communications amongst the monitor, cor-
poration, and government.110 The attorney-client relationship encourages 
candid discussions via the attorney-client privilege, but monitorships 
have been provided no enforceable means of protecting communica-
tions. As a result, a monitor’s ability to fulfill the role of legal counselor 
is hamstrung by the lack of predictable norms governing the monitor-
ship. 
Because a monitor engages in a role with dual functions, the monitor 
owes unfettered, honest advice to both of the monitor’s “clients”—the 
government and the corporation. The monitor must provide the corpora-
tion with recommendations that will ensure that the corporation’s busi-
ness decisions going forward will result in improved legal and regulato-
ry compliance. The monitor also owes the government an independent 
assessment of the challenges facing the corporation in achieving long-
term compliance, plus the monitor’s best efforts in recommending the 
most effective compliance regime. As part of the responsibilities to both 
“clients,” the monitor has a duty to advise both parties when they are 
engaged in a course of conduct that stymies the goal of the monitor’s 
representation. In some instances, this will require the monitor to devel-
op the most effective set of recommendations possible to ensure long-
term compliance, and in other instances it will also include recommen-
dations regarding the scope of the corporation’s culpability.111 That 
110 Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the attorney-
client privilege is intended “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients”). 
111 In a traditional attorney-client relationship, this type of joint representation would be 
rife with conflicts that could result in the preclusion of the lawyer representing the two cli-
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means an effective monitor should object if the government imposes re-
quirements onto a monitorship that may result in inefficiencies that stifle 
the monitorship’s goals. Similarly, an effective monitor should object if 
it is determined that the corporation is failing to be forthcoming and co-
operative in the monitor’s investigation efforts. A monitorship lacking 
binding confidentiality may not be able to effectuate these goals because 
the parties will be on guard when interacting with one another. 
It is important to remember that the goal of a monitorship should not 
be thought of solely as a penalty.112 A monitorship also should not be 
thought of as probation, which is a separate and distinct penalty that the 
government may pursue as part of a formal adjudicatory proceeding. In-
stead, the goal of a monitorship is that the corporation, monitor, and 
government work together to ensure that the corporation does not en-
gage in future improper conduct. To minimize or inhibit a monitor’s re-
sponsibility to provide legal counsel to the corporation and insist on a 
false sense of “pure monitor independence” creates a monitorship struc-
ture that is unnecessarily adversarial between the monitor and the corpo-
ration wherein the monitor is perceived as simply a governmental advo-
cate or agent. Indeed, monitorships involve highly complex, intertwined 
relationships that cannot fairly be characterized within any adversarial or 
“us-versus-them” paradigm.113
ents. Joint representation is, however, typically allowed “so long as the lawyer gets informed 
consent from all parties.” Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 443; see Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.7 cmts. 26–33 (2013). Similarly, the law of agency allows “[t]wo or more per-
sons . . . as coprincipals [to] appoint an agent to act for them in the same transaction or mat-
ter” with the coprincipals’ consent. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency §§ 3.16, 
8.06(2) (2006). The consent in both contexts requires the lawyer or the agent to disclose all 
material facts so that the joint clients or coprincipals are fully informed regarding the scope 
of any potential conflicts, and the drawbacks and benefits associated with the relationship. 
112 Remember, the corporation has paid a significant penalty through monetary restitution. 
Moreover, the Morford Memorandum states that a monitor’s responsibility is “not to further 
punitive goals.” Morford Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2. 
113 Admittedly, the relationship between a criminal offender and a probation officer is also 
multifaceted in that the probation officer assists the offender in obtaining necessary services 
while also ensuring that the offender does not commit additional crimes. See Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2014–15 Edition, Pro-
bation Officers and Correctional Treatment Specialists (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/
ooh/community-and-social-service/probation-officers-and-correctional-treatment-specialists.
htm#tab-2. Yet the fact that corporate crimes are conducted by agents of the corporation cre-
ates a different set of considerations than those associated with crimes committed by an indi-
vidual. The corporation’s agents charged with entering into the agreement with the govern-
ment on behalf of the corporation and cooperating with the monitorship are likely not the 
same corporate agents that engaged in the underlying legal violation. These corporate agents, 
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Adversarial monitoring relationships have been demonstrated to de-
crease compliance. For example, Professor Milton Regan has explained 
that, within firms, “aggressive compliance monitoring can have an unfa-
vorable effect on the motivation of agents to comply with rules.”114
Thus, a highly monitored employee “regard[s] supervision as unreason-
ably pervasive and intrusive.”115 This can lead to the development of “an 
adversarial attitude toward the company, its supervisors, and the rules 
themselves.”116 Employees “may come to attribute their own compliance 
as motivated by coercion, rather than by their own desire to act proper-
ly.”117 “When this perception emerges, the result ultimately may be low-
er rates of compliance than would exist in the absence of close monitor-
ing and visible penalties.”118 Analogizing these findings to the monitor-
monitorship context helps to explain why it is important to encourage a 
cooperative relationship among the monitor, corporation, and govern-
ment. Framing the monitorship as primarily providing legal counseling 
to the corporation and the government permits the corporation to view 
the monitor as a partner, which allows the corporation to maintain its 
own view of compliance as emanating from the corporation’s motivation 
to engage in ethical and legal conduct, as opposed to the corporation’s 
motivation to adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement. 
Thus, a monitorship should be re-conceptualized as a cooperative re-
lationship among the monitor, corporation, and government where the 
monitor is providing legal counsel to both the corporation and the gov-
ernment. Of course, merely stating that the corporation and its monitor 
have a cooperative relationship is insufficient. Trusted relationships are 
not formed so easily, which is why effectuating this change in monitor-
ship structure requires drawing concrete and reliable boundaries that 
outline the scope of the monitorship relationship, as well as adopting 
clear protections associated with it. Toward this end, this Article sug-
gests that the monitor’s “clients,” both the corporation and the govern-
ment, would benefit from the protections provided by a statutory privi-
lege. 
who are individually innocent of wrongdoing, have a whole host of other duties to the corpo-
ration and shareholders that affect their decision making when engaged in a monitorship. 
114 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 Geo. L.J. 1957, 1970 (2006). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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B. A Protected Monitor-Client Relationship 
As demonstrated by the work of Professors Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite, compliance strategies that rely solely on the imposition of 
penalties “undermine the good will of regulated actors who do have a 
desire to act ethically.”119 Thus, it is important to create regulatory struc-
tures that “have the capability of activating both economic rationality 
and the desire to act ethically.”120 By encouraging the monitor, corpora-
tion, and government to work together, the corporation becomes a part-
ner to the monitor in the efforts to achieve greater compliance. Instead 
of framing the monitor as an adversary to be bested, the monitor is 
framed as a partner with whom to cooperate to achieve a better long-
term outcome for the corporation. The hope is that the partnership, as 
opposed to the adversarial framework, will encourage a desire to act eth-
ically on the part of the corporation and its internal agents. Thus, mech-
anisms must be put in place allowing the corporation to begin to see the 
monitor as more of a partner and less of an adversary. This Part suggests 
that this could be done by providing a statutory privilege that would pro-
tect the communications amongst the government, corporation, and 
monitor during the monitorship term. 
This Section begins by briefly explaining the traditional attorney-
client privilege,121 the related work product doctrine, why the protections 
are provided, and what they do not protect against. It then explores the 
manner in which privilege has been extended and rejected as to corpora-
tions and how monitorships would likely be treated. It next explores 
statutory grants of privilege to accountants and statutory privilege waiv-
ers provided to corporations making disclosures to financial regulators. 
It concludes by arguing in favor of a new statutory privilege governing 
monitorships. 
119 Id. at 1968 (citing Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate 24–25 (1992)). 
120 Id. (citing Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 119, at 47). 
121 The attorney-client privilege finds its origins in sixteenth-century English common law, 
and it has developed in the United States through the common law and statutory enactments 
into a sacrosanct concept within the U.S. legal system. See Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 
258. The privilege was not fully accepted by the English courts until after 1800. Id. 
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1. Scope and Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work 
Product Doctrine 
Only “(1) communications (2) made between privileged persons 
(3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal as-
sistance for the client” are entitled to the attorney-client privilege.122 It is 
seen as encouraging “open communication between clients and their 
lawyers.”123 This open communication ensures that clients receive effec-
tive representation and serves the interests of the public more broadly by 
providing clients with advice regarding the legality of possible conduct 
and effective representation in our adversarial court system. Information 
found to be subject to the attorney-client privilege cannot be compelled 
from the attorney or client, leaving the communications between the two 
completely private. In other words, those communications are protected 
against intrusion from those outside the attorney-client relationship, un-
less the client decides to waive the privilege and disclose the content of 
communications between the client and attorney.124 The privilege be-
longs to the client. It is important to remember that the privilege protects 
only the communications, not the underlying facts discussed in the 
communications, which may be subject to disclosure to third parties.125
The work product doctrine protects “documents and tangible things 
that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consult-
ant, [etc.]).”126 The work product doctrine does not protect materials that 
a lawyer creates for reasons other than to prepare for litigation. It is con-
cerned with protecting the possession of lawyer-generated information 
that could reveal the lawyer’s thinking on how best to advocate for the 
client’s interest if litigation ensues. The work product doctrine is not, 
however, given the same sort of absolutist protection as that provided 
the traditional attorney-client privilege; an opposing party can obtain the 
material by demonstrating a “substantial need for the material[]” and an 
122 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000). 
123 Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 258. 
124 Id. at 305 (“A client loses the privilege with respect to a particular communication ei-
ther by consent or by conduct inconsistent with maintaining the privilege. Consent usually 
takes the form of disclosure of a privileged communication in an unprivileged setting; con-
duct inconsistent with maintaining the privilege includes a failure to object to an attempt by 
another to obtain or provide evidence of a privileged communication.” (citation omitted)). 
125 Id. at 260. 
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
ROOT_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2014 9:10 PM 
2014] Monitor-“Client” Relationship 557
inability “without undue hardship, [to] obtain [the] substantial equiva-
lent” of the material “by other means.”127
For example, if a lawyer instructs a client to gather all of the docu-
ments that might demonstrate that the client improperly engaged in in-
sider trading, the opposing side typically is not permitted to ask that the 
neat stack of all potentially damning documents be provided to them. 
They have a right to access each and every document through regular 
discovery processes, but the opposing party will have to find the docu-
ments through independent investigation. But if the client, after provid-
ing the attorney a neat stack of documents, were to then destroy the orig-
inals making the copies provided to the attorney the only evidence of 
those documents, the opposing party would be able to access the docu-
ments by establishing “substantial need” and “undue hardship.” Notably, 
even when the documents typically protected as work product are re-
quired to be provided to the opposing party, the corresponding commu-
nications between the attorney and client discussing legal advice retain 
their privileged protections under the attorney-client privilege. 
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are not all-
encompassing, all-protecting instruments. They are limited tools that 
protect certain types of communication and information to encourage 
robust discussion of the legal implications of facts and circumstances af-
fecting the client. It is important not to conceive of the privileges as pro-
tecting more than they are able to protect. 
2. Evidentiary Privilege and Corporations 
Because evidentiary privileges interfere with information seeking on 
the part of litigants attempting to ascertain the truth, courts apply eviden-
tiary privileges narrowly and are hesitant to recognize new privileges on 
their own.128 When the courts have established new evidentiary privileg-
es, they have often come as extensions from the traditionally accepted 
attorney-client privilege. 
Arguably the most important extension for corporations came in 1981 
when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that corporations could be con-
sidered clients for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.129 In Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court explained “that the best route to 
127 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
128 Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 258. 
129 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981). 
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corporate compliance with the law is ‘full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their [corporate] clients.’”130 The Supreme Court al-
so recognized that full and frank communication will not occur between 
parties unless the parties are assured that their communications will re-
main private.131 The parties must know that they can give their lawyer 
enough information to ensure complete and accurate legal advice with-
out worrying that the underlying information provided to the lawyer will 
result in liability for the corporation. 
The Supreme Court’s grant of attorney-client privilege for corpora-
tions has resulted in a decades-long struggle with the government re-
garding the scope and nature of the privilege. When wrongdoing is dis-
covered within the corporation, the government typically wants 
unfettered access to the corporation’s information regarding the underly-
ing misconduct, including the details of any internal investigation con-
ducted by the corporation. This usually requires a disclosure of docu-
ments protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine. The question, of course, is how the government can access this 
information, and the government typically needs the corporation to vol-
untarily comply.132 Thus, corporations and the government have at-
130 David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The 
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 147, 148–49
(2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). 
131 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.  
132 The government has implemented a variety of policies and procedures over time that 
were meant to encourage organizations to voluntarily waive their rights under the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Co-
operation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311 (2007) (dis-
cussing strategies adopted by the DOJ to investigate and prosecute corporate crimes). The 
height of this public struggle occurred during the mid-2000s when the DOJ issued instruc-
tions to prosecutors regarding how to conduct corporate criminal investigations and what 
factors a prosecutor should consider in determining leniency and similar items. In 2003, the 
DOJ issued what is known as the Thompson Memorandum, which is a charging guideline 
for federal prosecutors entitled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organiza-
tions.” Id. at 318. The Thompson Memorandum “directed prosecutors to consider an entity’s 
refusal to waive its attorney-client and work product protections as an indicator of noncoop-
eration and therefore a factor weighing in favor of indictment.” Id. at 347 (citing Memoran-
dum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. 
Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations 3 (Jan. 20, 2003)). 
However, after coming under intense pressure—from interest groups, the American Bar As-
sociation, and former DOJ officials—as well as facing the threat of congressional action in 
the form of the proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, the DOJ retreated and 
issued the McNulty Memorandum in December 2006. Id. at 345–52. The McNulty Memo-
randum deleted “the explicit reference to the willingness to waive privileges,” and prosecu-
tors were required to “establish a ‘legitimate need’ for privileged information and seek DOJ 
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tempted to put forth a variety of arguments in favor of granting protec-
tions of privilege to what is essentially corporate material provided to 
the government as part of investigation and compliance efforts. 
One of the first attempts to provide the government access to attor-
ney-client privileged information while not waiving the privilege was 
through the use of selective waiver, which allows “corporations to share 
their confidential attorney-client communications” with the government 
“without having to waive the privileged status of these documents 
against other parties.”133 Two approaches adopted by the federal courts 
are relevant for purposes of this Article. First, a few courts allow selec-
tive waiver whenever a corporation provides privileged material to the 
government.134 Second, some courts permit selective waiver if, at the 
time the corporation provided the privileged information to the govern-
ment, it expressed a clear intent to prevent further disclosures.135 But the 
majority of circuit courts have rejected the concept of selective or lim-
ited waiver outright, arguing that any disclosure of privileged communi-
cations waives the privilege with respect to all future parties that may 
seek the disclosed information.136 This rejection provides a rationale for 
corporations to resist providing attorney-client privileged material to the 
government for fear that unintended third parties would gain access to 
the documents.137 The government, however, continues to make argu-
ments that are essentially based on selective waiver.138
Corporate attorneys and the government then attempted to obtain pro-
tection for privileged materials under the joint defense and common in-
approval before requesting it.” Id. at 351 (quoting Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations 8 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf). 
133 Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privi-
lege, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 789, 797 (1984); see also Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 320–22. 
134 See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977). 
135 See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 
638, 644–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
136 See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 
304 (6th Cir. 2002). 
137 This outcome may, however, have been avoided if the suggested change to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which would have permitted corporations to assert selective waiver, had 
been adopted. Some corporate counsel opposed the proposed adoption. See Richter, supra 
note 71, at 133–34. 
138 See Total Agreement, supra note 42, at attachment D para. 3. See generally Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 40. 
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terest privileges.139 When two or more parties jointly retain a lawyer to 
represent them in a matter, the communications made by any of the joint 
clients to the lawyer for the purposes of seeking legal advice related to 
“the joint representation are privileged against the rest of the world, but 
not privileged against use by one joint client against another.”140 Similar-
ly, the common interest privilege permits parties with “common interests 
to coordinate their positions without destroying the privileged status of 
their communications.”141 The privilege is meant to facilitate coopera-
tion between parties in either transactional or litigation contexts and 
does not require the parties to be on the same side. Opposing parties who 
happen to have a common interest may claim the privilege for “commu-
nications that serve the purpose of advancing the common interests.”142
The courts have also rejected these efforts. For example, the joint de-
fense rationale was rejected by a district court, which found that the cor-
porate defendant was “not engaged in a joint action with . . . the SEC or 
the district attorney. Instead, it has merely supplied documents that both 
agencies require for their own investigations.”143 In United States v. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the First Circuit found that 
although MIT and the Defense Department’s Audit Agency, with 
whom MIT had shared privileged information, had a common interest 
in the performance of MIT’s defense contracts, this was not the kind 
of “common interest” that the privilege cases meant, i.e., it was not 
akin to co-parties presenting a common defense in litigation.144
3. Extensions of Evidentiary Privilege Applied to Monitorships 
Courts presented with the above arguments in favor of providing se-
lective waiver, joint defense, or common interest privileges protections 
were presented with privileged material that the government was at-
tempting to access as part of its investigation. It is, however, important 
to differentiate between work done by outside and internal counsel while 
conducting an internal investigation and work done by a monitor con-
139 Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 321. 
140 Id. at 266. 
141 Id. at 267. 
142 Id. 
143 In re Tyco Int’l Multidistrict Litig., No. MDL 02-1335-B, 2004 WL 556715, at *2 
(D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2004). 
144 Hazard et al., supra note 71, at 321 (citing United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 
F.3d 681, 685–88 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
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ducting an investigation to effectuate the terms of the monitorship. 
These are two distinct inquiries. 
The internal investigation encompasses a traditional corporate attor-
ney-client privileged relationship where the attorneys for the corporation 
are engaged in the investigation for the benefit of the client and, typical-
ly, in anticipation of litigation. Thus, the outputs of the investigation are 
properly provided attorney-client and work product protections. What 
has been rejected by courts are attempts to protect the fruits of these in-
ternal investigations, which were completed within the confines of the 
attorney-client privileged relationship, via the selective waiver, joint de-
fense, and common interest privileges. 
But the monitor’s relationship with the corporation and the govern-
ment is different than the role of the lawyer who conducts the internal 
investigation for the company and then negotiates an agreement with the 
government. As explained above, the monitor is actively engaged in re-
sponsibilities to and duties towards both the corporation and the gov-
ernment in tandem, because the monitorship arises out of an agreement 
between the corporation and the government. At no time does the moni-
tor have a unitary relationship with either the corporation or govern-
ment. The fruits of the monitor’s efforts, its recommendations and re-
ports, are items prepared for the benefit of the government and the 
corporation. 
As a result, attempting to utilize selective waiver is not an appropriate 
option for the monitorship context. Because there is no separate relation-
ship between the monitor and the corporation, the government is a party 
to the relationship due to its participation in the settlement agreement, so 
there is no need to selectively waive the monitorship documents when 
producing them to the government. The selective waiver option is really 
of primary interest to those attempting to provide the results of an inter-
nal investigation to the government without waiving privilege protec-
tions. Additionally, the joint defense privilege would not work in the 
monitorship context, because there is no “joint defense.” The monitor is 
not representing the government and the corporation in a legal proceed-
ing against another party. 
In theory, the common interest privilege could apply to the monitor-
ship relationship. Essentially, the corporation and the government enter 
into an agreement that requires the retention of a monitor. A monitor 
provides reports and recommendations to both the corporation and the 
government and is providing a service to both parties. The goals of the 
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corporation and the government are aligned in that they hope to enter in-
to a monitorship that will assist the corporation in its efforts to improve 
long-term regulatory and legal compliance. It seems unlikely, however, 
that a court would approve of a common law privilege in this circum-
stance, because courts have been highly reluctant to provide extensions 
to the attorney-client privilege. This reluctance can be seen in the courts’ 
rejections of the Secret Service privilege145 and the parent-child privi-
lege,146 as well as the divergent court rulings regarding the self-critical 
analysis qualified privilege, which “allows individuals or businesses to 
candidly evaluate their compliance with regulatory and legal require-
ments without creating evidence that may be used against them in future 
litigation.”147
These are all situations where there were serious public policy con-
siderations weighing in favor of providing a mechanism of protection so 
that the parties to these communications would be incentivized to enter 
into candid conversations and analysis regarding future courses of con-
duct. Based on these rejections, it seems very unlikely that a protection 
of privilege for monitorships will emanate from the courts. This is, how-
ever, ironic in that the courts are seemingly comfortable with providing 
court-ordered confidentiality, as was demonstrated by the initial district 
court order in the AIG case. This may be a problem of semantics and 
degree—a court may feel more comfortable entering a one-time confi-
dentiality order as opposed to taking the step of providing a common 
law evidentiary privilege. Regardless of the motivation, the courts are 
unlikely to provide the rules needed to offer monitorships the predicta-
bility required to facilitate a monitor’s role as a legal counselor. Thus, 
any rules provided will need to come via statute. 
4. Extensions of Privilege via Statute 
Because courts are reluctant to provide extensions beyond the tradi-
tional attorney-client privilege paradigm, statutory tools have been uti-
145 In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (rejecting the 
“protective function privilege” for Secret Service agents called to testify regarding the Presi-
dent’s activities). 
146 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 501.02[9] (10th ed. 
2011) (“[C]ourts have refused to provide privilege . . . protection for the parent-child rela-
tionship.”); see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that privi-
leges are to be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the search for truth).  
147 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.48[2] (3d ed. 2008).  
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lized to obtain additional protections in certain situations. Two such 
statutes dealing with privilege outside the confines of the traditional at-
torney-client relationship are relevant for purposes of this Article. 
First is the privilege provided to relationships between accountants 
and taxpayers. Accountants are allowed privileged communications pro-
vided those communications would be privileged if between a taxpayer 
and an attorney.148 This is a privilege created by federal statute; it is not 
a common law evidentiary privilege like the attorney-client privilege. 
The privilege applies only to “noncriminal tax matter[s] before the In-
ternal Revenue Service” or “noncriminal tax proceeding[s] in Federal 
court brought by or against the United States.”149 Before this privilege 
was enacted, to obtain a privileged conversation between a tax account-
ant and a client, the client had to retain a lawyer who then retained the 
tax accountant to assist the lawyer, thereby allowing the tax accountant 
the benefit of the attorney-client privileged relationship as an agent of 
the lawyer. Congress, however, allowed for a statutory privilege protect-
ing conversations between tax accountants and taxpayers seeking ad-
vice, which eliminated the need for this legal maneuvering. Congress 
understood that facilitating conversations between tax accountants and 
taxpayers allowed taxpayers to ask the questions needed to ensure that 
they complied with the applicable tax laws. 
Congress has also allowed, via federal statute, three odd exceptions to 
the traditional norms regarding corporate attorney-client privilege in the 
context of banks, as recently explained by Professor Bruce Green. For 
the first exception, “federal banking agencies, including both the pru-
dential bank regulators and the recently established Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau . . . assert that [under 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x)] they have 
the legal authority selectively to compel banks and other financial insti-
tutions they supervise to disclose attorney-client privileged infor-
mation.”150 Second, “when banks disclose privileged material to bank 
regulators, even if voluntarily, [the] banks retain the privilege with re-
spect to third parties pursuant to specific federal statutory authority.”151
In the third exception, “under agency policy, once bank regulators obtain 
148 See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2006). 
149 Id. § 7525(a)(2). 
150 Bruce A. Green, The Attorney-Client Privilege—Selective Compulsion, Selective 
Waiver and Selective Disclosure: Is Bank Regulation Exceptional?, 2013 J. Prof. Law. 85, 
86 (footnotes and citation omitted).  
151 Id. at 87 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x) (2012)). 
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privileged information from a bank, whether through compulsion or vol-
untarily, the regulators reserve the right to share the information with 
any other agency, including federal law enforcement and tax authorities 
and state attorneys general, notwithstanding the selective waiver stat-
ute.”152
There are two important takeaways based on these statutory treat-
ments of privilege for purposes of this Article. First, Congress has al-
ready recognized that a privileged relationship can be granted to a highly 
skilled professional who is providing legal advice and who is not a law-
yer. Thus, it would not seem too far afield to grant this type of privilege 
to a monitor providing legal counsel to the government and a corpora-
tion during the course of a monitorship. Second, Congress has recog-
nized the value in allowing regulators access to privileged material while 
still permitting the corporation to retain its attorney-client privilege over 
the material. Thus, Congress understands that the government’s en-
forcement efforts are often promoted by providing a clear set of rules 
that protect communications between the corporation and the govern-
ment as well as between the corporation and its lawyers. 
5. A Privilege Protecting the Monitor-Client Relationship 
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that monitors are providing a 
unique service to both the corporation and the government by providing 
a root-cause analysis followed by a legal counseling function in the form 
of recommendations and reports. It has also explained that this legal 
counseling function is stifled by a lack of predictable norms surrounding 
monitorships, as evidenced by the ad hoc structure of monitorship 
agreements over time, as well as the unpredictable outcomes of recent 
court decisions. The monitorship has, however, become a common tool 
utilized by the government in its efforts to achieve greater corporate 
compliance and self-policing. The lack of predictable rules governing 
these relationships appears to be problematic for those deciding whether 
to enter into a monitorship prior to knowing what rules will ultimately 
govern the monitorship. This Article has also demonstrated that it is un-
152 Id. at 87–88 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(t) (2012)). This exception is obviously a signifi-
cant run around the corporate attorney-client privilege that seems inconsistent with the con-
cepts surrounding the protections of privilege. Moreover, the potential of government over-
reach under this statute is quite high. It is not at all clear to me that this type of expansive 
statute is the ideal to strive for or even that this statutory framework should continue. 
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likely that the courts will provide the concrete set of rules needed in this 
context. Thus, it is time for Congress to step in and provide some clear 
boundaries through the enactment of a statutory privilege that can be re-
lied upon by the government, private parties, monitors, and courts when 
monitorships arise.153
The statutory privilege provided for a monitorship relationship should 
largely track the protections provided by the attorney-client privilege 
and work product protection. In other words, the privilege attached to 
the monitor-client relationship should protect: (1) communications made 
amongst the monitor, government, and corporation, in confidence for the 
purpose of obtaining or providing legal counseling to the corporation 
and the government; and (2) documents and tangible things that are pre-
pared by a monitor to fulfill the goals of the monitorship. 
The standard provided generally tracks the protections provided by 
the attorney-client privilege and is based on a similar rationale—full and 
frank discussion between a monitor and its “clients” will be best effectu-
ated if the communications occur within the confines of a privileged re-
lationship. The standard provided is, however, more expansive than 
what would be protected by the work product doctrine. As is explained 
above, the work product doctrine protects only those documents and 
tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation.154 The suggested 
statutory privilege would protect all documents and tangible things pre-
153 This proposal is purposely broad so that the benefits associated with monitorships that 
are individually tailored to effectuate the best recommendations for each company remain. 
This broad proposal does, however, leave two open questions. The first is what precise du-
ties the monitor has and to whom it owes those duties. At a minimum, it would seem obvious 
that the monitor owes the corporation duties of care and loyalty. Khanna and Dickinson rec-
ommend “a fiduciary duty akin to that of attorneys or any profession to their client” for mon-
itors serving in an advisory role. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1740. The Morford 
Memorandum, which is internal DOJ guidance that applies only to criminal matters, states 
that the “monitor is not responsible to the corporation’s shareholders.” Morford Memoran-
dum, supra note 1, at 5. But see Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1737, 1739–40 (advo-
cating for reforms targeted at “influential monitors,” or monitors with “the ability to fire em-
ployees or make operational decisions,” including (1) “develop[ing] fiduciary duties for 
monitors,” (2) drafting deferred prosecution agreements to “specify[] what the monitor’s du-
ties and powers are,” and (3) allowing the appointing agency “some supervisory role over 
monitors”). 
The second question is whether those acting as monitors should be limited to members of 
regulated professions, like lawyers and auditors. There may be a concern that monitors who 
are not members of self-regulating professions may be less constrained. Both of these ques-
tions appear ripe for further research. 
154 See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
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pared by a monitor to effectuate the goals of the monitorship. This ex-
pansion is necessary for two primary reasons. 
First, a monitor’s reports are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
The reports contain more than a monitor’s recommendations (for exam-
ple, legal counseling); they also provide the government information re-
garding the actions the monitor undertook that led the monitor to con-
clude on the set of recommendations provided. The government has a 
strong interest in having full information and knowledge regarding this 
process, which requires the report in its entirety to be provided a protec-
tion of privilege.155 Protecting the report, however, would not protect the 
underlying facts that formed the basis of the report. Thus, the underlying 
facts would still be available for third parties to obtain through the regu-
lar civil litigation discovery process. 
Second, a monitor’s recommendations are a mix of business and legal 
advice. The confluence of business and legal advice is a cause of con-
sternation for many members of the legal profession given the current 
complexities associated with modern-day business transactions.156 And 
in the context of a monitorship, the legal advice and the business advice 
provided by a monitor are intertwined. The mix of legal and business 
advice is necessary to develop a set of recommendations for the corpora-
tion and the government that will ensure long-term legal and regulatory 
compliance. 
The proposed statutory privilege would not, however, need to be invi-
olate. Just as a client can waive the attorney-client privilege, the corpo-
ration and the government would be able to waive the privilege if that is 
the intent of the parties when entering into the settlement agreement. 
They would need to specify the waiver in the settlement agreement, 
which expresses the intent of the parties going forward. This would al-
low for monitorship documents to be made publicly available when ap-
propriate while allowing the default relationship to be one of privilege. 
Currently, parties have no ability to contract for the privilege. Under the 
155 When the government enters into an attorney-client privileged relationship, “govern-
ment documents protected by the attorney-client privilege are generally exempt from pro-
duction under [FOIA].” Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 5.18, at 
358 (5th ed. 2012). The government privilege, however, “is recognized only for communica-
tions that are made and kept in confidence by the governmental entity.” Id. at 359. Thus, al-
lowing for a monitor’s privilege will also require considerations on how expanding another 
governmental privilege will be affected by FOIA. 
156 See, e.g., id. § 5.16, at 349–50 (discussing the difficulties of applying attorney-client 
privilege due to corporate lawyers’ involvement in both business and legal decisions). 
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proposal, a monitorship would get the protections of privilege, but the 
corporation and the government retain the ability to waive, or contract 
around, the privilege protection provided by statute. Additionally, if a 
party were able to demonstrate that it is actually unable to access the un-
derlying documents and facts that served as the basis of the monitor’s 
reports, the party would be able to access the monitor’s reports under a 
theory of “undue hardship” in much the same way the exception works 
for material falling under the traditional work product protection.157 For 
example, if, after a monitor’s reports have been submitted, the corpora-
tion shreds all of the underlying documents relied upon by the monitor, 
that would be grounds for claiming undue hardship and obtaining access 
to the monitor’s reports. 
Providing these protections of privilege is a modest expansion of the 
types of common law and statutory privileges already in place and will 
yield the concrete set of rules needed to give parties a sense of normali-
zation when entering into a monitorship. 
C. Benefits to a Monitor-Client Relationship 
1. A Privileged Monitor-Client Relationship Provides Needed Stability 
for Private Lawyers
Providing for a privileged monitor-client relationship will create a 
certain level of predictability and concrete sets of expectations that will 
aid three sets of private lawyers actively involved in monitorships: 
(1) the representative-lawyer who is responsible for negotiating the 
agreement that results in a monitorship with the company; (2) the law-
yer-monitor who is a lawyer acting as a monitor; and (3) the lawyer act-
ing as counsel to the non-lawyer-monitor, like the auditor-monitor. 
Monitorships as currently structured create a variety of pitfalls for these 
individuals. 
The representative-lawyer negotiates the agreement between the gov-
ernment and the corporation that results in the retention of a monitor. A 
good representative-lawyer will attempt to negotiate and draft a settle-
ment agreement detailing a monitorship that is narrow in scope and 
length of time, but there are no guarantees under the current ad hoc re-
gime of structuring monitorships, leaving representative-lawyers unable 
to provide concrete guidance to clients. Even when relatively explicit 
157 See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
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terms are contained in the settlement agreements, they are often entered 
into prior to the selection of a monitor and are, by necessity, entered into 
prior to the monitor’s development of a detailed work plan.158 In addi-
tion, the representative-lawyer aids the company in drafting the terms of 
the monitor’s contract or retention agreement, but again, under the cur-
rent monitorship framework, there is little guaranteed protection for the 
corporation even when explicitly negotiated by the representative law-
yer. 
For example, in the AIG case, the representative-lawyer attempted to 
guarantee confidentiality of the information AIG provided to the moni-
tor by working with the SEC to obtain an order preventing the dissemi-
nation of the Monitor Reports.159 Assuming the representative-lawyer 
was clear in communicating to the client that there were no guarantees 
associated with confidentiality, one would assume that the only conse-
quence to the representative-lawyer would be an unhappy client who 
might terminate the representation. But in the AIG case, it is possible 
that the client might have attempted to bring a legal malpractice action 
against the representative-lawyer if the district court’s decision had been 
upheld by D.C. Circuit. This is because the district court relied heavily 
on the fact that the parties came back approximately eighteen months af-
ter the court initially granted the consent order to clarify the parties’ in-
tent that the Monitor Reports not “be disseminated or available to any-
one outside of the entities identified in the Consent.”160 If the client 
perceived this delayed request as a result of the representative-lawyer’s 
malpractice, the court’s decision to deny confidentiality could have re-
sulted in more serious harms to the representative-lawyer. 
Similarly, the lawyer-monitor entering into the monitorship relation-
ship is typically left in largely uncharted waters because there is a dearth 
of guidance regarding the appropriate manner for conducting the moni-
torship, other than the broadly worded terms of the contractual agree-
ment establishing the monitorship. The scope of a lawyer-monitor’s du-
ties to the monitored entity and government is hard to determine because 
158 The monitor, corporation, and government develop an agreed upon work plan, which 
requires the monitor’s involvement. That is not to say the representative-lawyer cannot par-
ticipate in the process, but the agreement requiring the retention of the monitor would typi-
cally have already been memorialized.  
159 SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). See generally supra text accompanying notes 89–102. 
160 Id. at 78. 
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the lawyer-monitor is not engaged in a formal attorney-client relation-
ship, yet the lawyer-monitor remains subject to certain professional 
norms and standards. Because many of the Model Rules are specifically 
limited to duties to “clients,” lawyer-monitors may be able to engage in 
conduct during a monitorship that would be inappropriate in an attorney-
client relationship without risking sanction from the court or bar. More-
over, the lawyer-monitor may feel uncomfortable providing legal advice 
on how to ensure compliance with the law outside the confines of a priv-
ileged relationship. Additionally, this lack of privilege may effectively 
stifle the corporation’s willingness to ask questions or raise issues that it 
believes will cause the lawyer-monitor concern, which would impede 
the lawyer-monitor’s ability to provide the best possible advice and 
counsel. The government’s attempts to provide protections via confiden-
tiality agreements in settlement agreements, like in the Total Agree-
ment,161 are laudable but likely would not withstand challenge in court. 
Privilege cannot be contractually achieved and confidentiality is essen-
tially a poor man’s version of privilege. If a court compels disclosure, 
the confidentiality guarantees are worth very little. 
Finally, the lawyer representing the non-lawyer-monitor is in an 
equally difficult position. For example, if Acme Corp. is required to re-
tain Big Four accounting firm as its monitor, Big Four may need to, in 
turn, retain an attorney to assist it in its monitorship efforts. Big Four 
will likely rely on the attorney to provide Big Four with the legal exper-
tise necessary to develop the recommendations being provided to Acme 
Corp. But what is the scope of the “privileged” information between Big 
Four and its attorney? In this case, the attorney-client relationship is one 
relational level away from a monitorship relationship. Would the attor-
ney’s work that is utilized by Big Four to develop recommendations be 
subject to privileged protections? If Big Four were a lawyer-monitor, 
that information would not appear to be entitled to any evidentiary privi-
lege under the terms of the current monitorship agreements, so it would 
seem strange to allow privileged protections to attach to work done by 
the monitor’s agents if it is not allowed when the monitor completes the 
work. Moreover, would Big Four’s attorneys be allowed to speak direct-
ly to Acme Corp.? Would that confuse Acme Corp. as to whether the 
conversations with Big Four’s attorneys are privileged even when Acme 
Corp. knows its conversations with Big Four are not entitled to privi-
161 Total Agreement, supra note 42. 
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lege? In short, the lawyer representing the non-lawyer-monitor has a 
minefield of potential pitfalls to dodge in its efforts to provide legal ad-
vice to the non-lawyer-monitor who is then responsible for providing le-
gal counsel to the monitored corporation. It is doubtful that any private 
lawyer would feel comfortable guaranteeing protections of privilege 
when facing this sort of scenario even while it is likely that the non-
lawyer-monitor would expect just those sorts of privileged protections. 
The above are just a few of the many concerns private lawyers in-
volved with modern-day monitorships are forced to confront. Allowing 
for a privileged monitor-client relationship solves many of these prob-
lems and uncertainties. At a minimum, the private lawyers would have 
comfort when they advised their client or undertook the monitorship that 
when they said something would be “privileged,” it would actually be 
provided the protections of an evidentiary privilege. Eliminating the var-
ious uncertainties currently surrounding who can access information 
from the monitorship, what can be accessed, and how the information 
gathered during the scope of monitorships will be utilized by the moni-
tor or disclosed would greatly assist private lawyers responsible for in-
teracting with the monitorship process. 
2. A Privileged Monitor-Client Relationship Creates Consistent Norms 
Instead of suggesting a privileged monitor-client relationship, this Ar-
ticle could have argued that only lawyer-monitors should be allowed to 
enter into privileged relationships with monitored corporations. The ear-
liest settlement agreements within the FCPA context, which required the 
retention of independent law firms, understood that the role of a lawyer-
monitor could result in the belief by some that a formal attorney-client 
relationship would ensue. Moreover, proposed language in the Account-
ability in Deferred Prosecution Act, which was proposed in both 2008 
and 2009 but died in committee, has been characterized as containing a 
requirement for “potential monitors to have experience in criminal and 
civil litigation,” which might suggest that monitors need to be attor-
neys.162 It is an easier argument from both a practical and analytical per-
spective because there are a variety of extensions to the traditional attor-
ney-client privilege paradigm provided to lawyers who provide legal 
162 See Khanna, supra note 3, at 238 (citing Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 
2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009); Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, 
H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008)). 
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advice in other contexts. Offering lawyers an additional extension to 
privileged protections would be an easier incremental step than the ar-
gument made here, which suggests a privileged monitor-client relation-
ship be made available for all corporate compliance monitors, even 
those who are not lawyers. But that seemingly easier argument would 
result in strange outcomes given the current reality surrounding the re-
tention of corporate compliance monitors, where accountants are some-
times utilized as monitors. Whether a monitored corporation is entitled 
to a privileged monitorship would hinge upon whether the corporation 
was able to retain a lawyer or non-lawyer as its monitor, which would 
provide an incomplete solution to the current problems facing monitor-
ship structures that lack clear rules regarding the enforceable confidenti-
ality associated with a monitor’s reports. 
More importantly, allowing for a privileged monitor-client relation-
ship will allow for consistent norms across similar investigations, and 
this will likely provide greater clarity to the individuals within corpora-
tions responsible for responding to a monitor’s requests for information. 
For example, a corporation that discovers wrongdoing will often conduct 
an internal investigation prior to reporting the violation to the govern-
ment.163 The investigation often requires obtaining documents and in-
formation from individual employees within the corporation. If an indi-
vidual employee provides an internal document entitled to attorney-
client privilege to the outside attorney conducting the internal investiga-
tion, the individual employee would not have waived any privilege on 
behalf of the corporation by providing the document to the outside attor-
ney conducting the investigation. Under the current monitorship struc-
ture, however, if an individual employee provided that same internal 
document to a lawyer-monitor, the privilege would be destroyed, despite 
the fact that under the monitorship terms, the monitored corporation is 
not required to waive its protections provided by the attorney-client priv-
ilege or work product doctrine. It seems reasonable to believe that em-
ployees within the corporation may have difficulty parsing the distinc-
tions and protections available when dealing with the outside lawyer 
engaged to conduct an internal investigation and the outside lawyer en-
gaged to conduct the investigation associated with the monitorship. 
Moreover, the investigation associated with the monitorship may have 
even more significant ramifications for an individual employee’s liabil-
163 Green & Podgor, supra note 54, at 90–91.  
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ity. Professors Bruce Green and Ellen Podgor have recently argued that 
the current mechanisms for conducting internal investigations often lead 
to abuses in that “individuals with little or no legal training, and unaware 
of the ramifications and personal consequences, readily cooperate in 
providing information to corporate lawyers conducting internal investi-
gations,” often to the individuals’ detriment.164 They argue that the re-
quirements in the Model Rules that “lawyers . . . take steps to prevent or 
correct individuals’ erroneous beliefs that the corporation’s lawyers rep-
resent them . . . do not overcome all expectations developed by employ-
ees who have grown accustomed to turning to corporate counsel when 
an issue with legal implications arises.”165 But at least the employees get 
a guaranteed, concrete warning in the context of the internal investiga-
tion that has the potential to alert them to the possibility of individual li-
ability. In the context of a monitorship, a lawyer-monitor should give a 
similar warning to explain to the unrepresented employee that the law-
yer-monitor is not representing the employee. But it is not clear that the 
non-lawyer-monitor would provide a similar warning, although one 
would hope that a warning would be required. The upshot is that, to the 
extent one might worry that a legally unsophisticated employee would 
not clearly understand the ramifications of interacting with outside 
counsel, the concerns should be equal if not greater when the legally un-
sophisticated employee is left to interact with a corporate compliance 
monitor. 
Allowing a privileged monitor-client relationship should mitigate at 
least a portion of these concerns by allowing the individual employees to 
interact with the monitor conducting the investigation in the same man-
ner in which the individual interacts with outside counsel conducting the 
internal investigation. 
IV. DRAWBACKS AND UNRESOLVED CONCERNS
This Part outlines some of the drawbacks and unresolved concerns as-
sociated with the proposed monitor-client relationship. This Part ad-
dresses two objections: first, that allowing a privileged monitor-client 
relationship will provide the corporation with a vehicle to hide miscon-
duct and block the public’s ability to access information; and second, 
that this proposal will decrease the deterrent value of monitorships and 
164 Id. at 75. 
165 Id. 
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result in monitor capture. The Part then addresses two concerns that cor-
porations would continue to have regarding monitorships even under the 
Article’s proposed framework: the high costs of monitorship and the po-
tential for the discovery of new liabilities by the monitor. 
A. Drawbacks to a Monitor-Client Relationship 
Despite the many benefits associated with the proposed monitor-client 
relationship, the proposal does require making tradeoffs. The increased 
effectiveness of the monitorship may be at the expense of (perceived) 
monitor independence and public dissemination of information gleaned 
during the course of the monitorship. But even with these possible mar-
ginal costs, if the proposal results in more effective monitorships and in-
creased long-term legal and regulatory compliance, it would benefit not 
only the corporation, monitor, and government, but also the public and 
society at large. 
1. A Privileged Monitor-Client Relationship May Sacrifice the 
Independence of the Monitor and Result in the Monitor Shielding 
Corporate Misconduct 
Some may fear that allowing a privileged relationship between the 
monitor and the corporation will allow the corporation to shield improp-
er conduct behind the privileged relationship.166 For example, in 1998, it 
was discovered that attorneys for tobacco companies had grossly abused 
the attorney-client privilege by encouraging the tobacco companies to 
utilize the “privilege to conceal deception.”167 The confidential industry 
documents revealed that for over thirty years, tobacco companies were 
concerned about whether nicotine was addictive and whether the inges-
tion of tars correlated with cancers.168 The companies did not want to 
conduct scientific research that might become discoverable to other par-
ties, so they had “their ‘scientific’ research conducted under the close 
consultation, and sometimes under the management, of their lawyers. 
The idea was that bad findings could be held back as lawyer-client con-
166 See Lawton P. Cummings, Globalization and the Evisceration of the Corporate Attor-
ney-Client Privilege: A Re-Examination of the Privilege and a Proposal for Harmonization, 
76 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 29–30 (2008) (citing Stuart Taylor Jr., Tobacco Lawyers and the Case 
for Cover-up Reform, 33 Nat’l J. 388, 388–89 (2001)). 
167 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Tobacco Lawyers Shame the Entire Profession, Nat’l L.J., May 
18, 1998, at A22. 
168 Id.  
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fidences, whereas good findings could be described as the product of 
scientific inquiry.”169 Some may fear that allowing a privileged monitor-
client relationship could result in similar scandals and harm to the pub-
lic, such that only complete monitor independence can protect against 
possible misuses of the monitor-client relationship. 
These types of fears are largely misplaced. The lawyers who assisted 
the tobacco companies in committing this massive fraud upon the public 
were not acting within the bounds of their ethical obligations. A lawyer 
is to advise a client, not assist a client in wrongdoing. The Model Rules 
explicitly prohibit this type of conduct. One applicable rule states that 
“[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in con-
duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client.”170 A monitor, like a lawyer, is not engaged to assist the corpora-
tion in wrongdoing and a monitor’s knowledge of wrongdoing does not 
prevent the misconduct from being discovered. If a monitor were to as-
sist the corporation in improper misconduct, the monitor would be sub-
ject to independent legal and criminal sanctions. 
Moreover, in the context of the monitorship there is an additional 
check on the relationship that will deter collusion between the monitor 
and the corporation—the government. The three-party relationship 
amongst the monitor, corporation, and government makes it quite diffi-
cult for the corporation to hide its wrongdoing behind the guise of the 
privileged relationship because the government is a party to that rela-
tionship. The government will be alerted to the potential wrongdoing of 
the corporation, making it virtually impossible for the corporation to run 
from criminal sanctions. If a monitorship uncovers additional miscon-
duct that results in criminal sanctions, those sanctions would be subject 
to public disclosure just as the initial violation prompting the monitor-
ship was disclosed to the public. 
2. Lack of Public Disclosure 
There will be some who will lament the lack of public disclosure as-
sociated with the proposed monitorship structure. They would be in fa-
vor of the dissemination of a monitor’s reports to the public at large, so 
that people, like the reporter who intervened in the AIG case, would be 
169 Id. 
170 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2013). 
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able to accurately convey the scope and nature of corporations’ miscon-
duct. 
There is certainly something helpful, and in some instances cathartic, 
about bringing what was once hidden out into the light of day. This can 
often be seen in instances where what could be termed “public moni-
tors” provide an investigatory function that allows the public to deter-
mine the extent of wrongdoing. An example of a public monitor can be 
found in the role of “Louis J. Freeh, the former federal judge and direc-
tor of the F.B.I., who spent . . . seven months examining the [Jerry] 
Sandusky scandal at Penn State.”171 When the news of the child abuse 
scandal broke, it became incredibly important for the public, and for the 
reputational capital of the university, to have the matter fully investigat-
ed and disclosed so as to allow for healing to begin and the scandal to 
come to a conclusion. Given the nature of the scandal, a public investi-
gation was needed by an individual considered above reproach so that 
the university would not suffer years of additional innuendo and suspi-
cion regarding the scope of the misconduct.172
A corporate compliance monitor is not a public monitor. A corporate 
compliance monitor is engaged to ensure corporate compliance. This Ar-
ticle does not mean to suggest that public awareness of wrongdoing has 
no deterrent effect on conduct within corporations—it does. Yet the de-
terrent effect of allowing the public and investigative journalists full ac-
cess to a monitor’s reports must be balanced against the goal of encour-
aging a monitorship relationship that will result in the best 
recommendations for the corporation going forward, which will hopeful-
ly increase the effectiveness of future compliance efforts at the corpora-
tion. As demonstrated by the AIG case, AIG would not have consented 
to the monitorship if the information in the monitor’s reports were to 
have been made public.173 The public’s interest in having full access to 
171 Ken Belson, Abuse Scandal Inquiry Damns Paterno and Penn State: Fear of Publicity 
Cited in Effort to Conceal, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2012, at A1. 
172 Ironically, the importance of providing a full, public report quickly to ensure prompt 
resolution has resulted in additional controversy regarding the legitimacy of the Freeh report. 
See Genaro C. Armas, Paterno Family Issues Report, Challenges Freeh’s Findings, Wash. 
Times (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/10/paterno-family-
issues-report-challenges-freehs-fin/?page=all. 
173 Brief for the Appellant at 20–21, SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-5141) (“AIG’s willingness to make such complete disclosures to the [Independent 
Consultant], and the SEC’s ability to achieve the remedial and prophylactic relief obtained in 
the Consent, depended on the understanding that the [Independent Consultant] Reports 
would be kept confidential.”). 
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the monitor’s reports must be balanced against the possibility that there 
is a class of companies—some of which have the ability to effect sub-
stantial changes on the U.S. economy—who will balk at the imposition 
of a corporate compliance monitor without assurances of confidentiality. 
This proposal is not suggesting that wrongdoing be hidden from the 
public. The question is not whether there is an all-or-nothing disclosure 
of wrongdoing—under this proposal the wrongdoing and any additional 
misconduct discovered would be disclosed to the public. The monitor-
client privilege is simply meant to protect the communications among 
the monitor, corporation, and government, which includes keeping the 
monitor’s reports under the protections of privilege. 
One alternative to withholding a monitor’s reports in their entirety 
would be to provide the reports to the public but redact sensitive infor-
mation.174 For example, when a corporation repeatedly engages in unfair 
or deceptive practices or acts in a manner that disregards fair competi-
tion, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) often imposes, via consent 
order, a twenty-year biennial external audit, which requires an inde-
pendent third party to monitor and evaluate an offender.175 By statute, 
the FTC has a great deal of leeway in determining how much infor-
mation it will release regarding a consent order, but it is not allowed “to 
make public any trade secret or any commercial or financial information 
which is obtained from any person and which is privileged or confiden-
tial.”176 The FTC treats the “assessment reports” completed by the indi-
vidual conducting the biennial audit as confidential, and, when respond-
ing to FOIA requests, the FTC retains the right to designate large 
portions of the report, including information shared between the auditor 
and the company, withheld from the public record.177
174 Khanna, supra note 3, at 244 (explaining that “it is possible that certain parts of the 
monitors’ reports may not be essential to enhance the chances of reducing wrongdoing or 
alerting victims, but rather may be more embarrassing to the firm as a whole or may under-
mine its competitive position”). 
175 E.g., Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3184, Docket No. C-4365, at 6 (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf. 
176 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (2006). 
177 See, e.g., Letter from Dione J. Stearns, Assistant Gen. Counsel, FTC, to Ginger 
McCall, Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) (Sept. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/googlebuzz/FTC-Initial-Assessment-09-26-12.pdf (respond-
ing to EPIC’s FOIA request for Google’s Initial Privacy Assessment and producing a redact-
ed version of that document). 
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A similar set of norms could be duplicated in the monitor context and 
might be a good potential avenue to pursue.178 One could allow for a 
monitor-client privilege and still allow for the public dissemination of a 
monitor’s reports as long as the “privileged” information was redacted 
and kept confidential. This sort of resolution is, however, unlikely to 
quell the concerns of those who believe that public disclosure is needed. 
Negotiating the concerns of the public, the government, and the cor-
poration is a complicated exercise. Here, instead of full public disclosure 
or a completely confidential monitorship that withholds even wrongdo-
ing on the part of the corporation, this Article suggests a statutory privi-
lege that facilitates a more effective monitorship. Again, the public will 
still be made aware of the misconduct, just not the minutia. 
3. Inhibiting Private-Party Litigation
Others may argue that allowing public dissemination of a monitor’s 
reports will assist private-party litigation, which serves as a deterrent to 
corporate wrongdoing. There are some that will criticize the use of a 
monitor-client privilege because it will require duplicitous work on the 
part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. They will argue that it is more efficient to 
allow for public dissemination of a monitor’s report, so that the attor-
neys do not have to reproduce the investigation performed by the moni-
tor. Private-party litigation provides a benefit to overall compliance ef-
forts because it serves as yet another deterrent to corporate wrongdoing. 
Moreover, it allows for parties harmed by the corporate wrongdoing to 
receive compensation, which does not always occur as a result of the 
government investigation. 
These concerns are valid and the benefits of private-party litigation 
are not to be discounted. But those benefits, again, must be weighed 
against the interest in encouraging corporations to freely enter into rela-
tionships with corporate compliance monitors that result in the full and 
frank discussions necessary to develop the most effective set of recom-
178 Note that this is essentially what the district court judge in the AIG case had planned to 
provide to the reporter—redacted versions of the monitor’s report—although the suggested 
redactions do not appear to have been as extensive as those utilized in the FTC context. SEC 
v. Am. Int’l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2013). 
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mendations for the corporation’s compliance efforts.179 Corporations 
have concerns regarding greater dissemination of monitor reports, in-
cluding a fear that it may provide plaintiffs’ attorneys with grounds for 
filing lawsuits, which would result in large litigation costs for the corpo-
ration and potential damage to the value of the shareholders’ interest in a 
public corporation.180 If corporations believe there will be open disclo-
sure of monitors’ reports, it could, as argued by AIG, “negatively impact 
the free flow of proprietary and privileged information that is currently 
enjoyed by consultants and monitors, hindering the reliability of the re-
ports utilized by the SEC and other government agencies to fulfill over-
sight obligations within severe budget constraints.”181 Again, the privi-
lege suggested here would not prevent private-party litigation; instead, it 
would set up rules that facilitate the monitorship’s goals without also fa-
cilitating private-party litigation. 
B. Potential Concerns for Regulators 
Regulators may be hesitant to embrace this proposal for fear of de-
creasing the effectiveness of monitorships. The biggest concern for regu-
lators is likely that allowing a privileged relationship between the moni-
tor and the corporation may decrease the deterrent value of the 
monitorship. In addition, regulators may be concerned that encouraging 
a friendlier relationship between the monitor and corporation may result 
in monitor capture, making the monitor less apt to take an independent, 
skeptical viewpoint when dealing with the corporation. 
1. A Privileged Monitor-Client Relationship May Decrease the 
Deterrent Value of Monitorships 
Allowing for a more cooperative relationship between the monitor 
and the corporation, while consistent with the goals of monitorship, may 
decrease some of the deterrent effect of monitorships. Monitorships are 
often perceived as penalties by corporations and, like any rational actor, 
179 See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 703 (“[T]he advantages of opening the process to a 
wider group of stakeholders may be outweighed by the potential chilling effect on the corpo-
ration’s complete participation in the negotiations and the monitorship process.”). 
180 This is especially problematic if the information in the monitor’s report is not required 
to be included in the public company’s annual disclosures to the SEC.  
181 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 173, at 16. 
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the corporation will prefer to avoid the penalty.182 By structuring the 
monitorship in a less penalizing and more cooperative fashion, corpora-
tions may not feel as strong an incentive to avoid monitorships, thereby 
decreasing the deterrent value of monitorships. 
While it is true that the monitorship structure proposed here is less 
unpleasant, and purposely so, for the monitored corporation, the poten-
tial for superior disclosure by corporations to the monitors charged with 
providing recommendations for improving long-term compliance seems 
to outweigh that benefit. Why punish for the sake of punishment when 
long-term adherence to legal and regulatory frameworks can be achieved 
through less adversarial means? Again, this is an issue of balancing the 
deterrence benefit provided by including the retention of a compliance 
monitor as part of the terms of a settlement agreement with the possibil-
ity of structuring the monitorship in a manner that is more likely to im-
prove the future compliance of the corporation. 
2. Encouraging a Relationship Between the Monitor and Corporation 
May Result in Monitor Capture 
Encouraging a formalized relationship between the monitor and the 
corporation may also lead to “monitor capture,” a similar phenomenon 
to the much-examined “regulatory capture.” “Capture refers to an ex-
tremely close relationship between regulators and industry.”183 And 
while not all scholars believe that capture is problematic,184 it is accepted 
that capture could lead to “sympathy to industry (implying excessive 
sympathy), identification with industry’s interest, and (unduly) lax en-
forcement.”185 Similarly, there are some who may argue that this Arti-
cle’s proposal could lead to monitor capture, which would not increase 
the effectiveness of the monitorship. Indeed, if the ills associated with 
regulatory capture were to be translated into the monitorship relation-
ship, this Article’s proposal would likely decrease the effectiveness of 
monitorships. 
182 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1727–28 (explaining how “more influential 
monitors” are similar to sanctions). 
183 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 569, 570
(2012). 
184 Id. at 569–72 (noting the benefits associated with industry and regulators working to-
gether). 
185 Id. at 578–79 (citing Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving 
Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. Pub. Pol’y 61, 64, 66 (1992)). 
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There is, however, a check in this Article’s proposed framework that 
should diminish the likelihood of monitor capture—the government. As 
envisioned, the proposed framework creates a relationship amongst the 
monitor, corporation, and government. A monitor is an agent of both the 
corporation and the government and must act in the best interests of both 
parties at all times. In addition, the government has full access to the ac-
tivities and the communications between the monitor and the corpora-
tion—nothing is hidden from the government in the proposed frame-
work. Thus, the proposed framework builds in a significant check that 
should curb the incidents of negative monitor capture while allowing for 
the benefits of collaboration associated with monitor capture.186
C. Remaining Concerns for Corporations 
As demonstrated by the above discussion, adopting a new framework 
for monitorships designed around a privileged “monitor-‘client’ rela-
tionship” has many benefits for corporations and the long-term increased 
effectiveness of monitorships. There are, however, two concerns for 
corporations that will remain even if this Article’s suggestions are im-
plemented: (1) increased monitorship costs and (2) the possibility of ad-
ditional liability arising out of the monitorship. 
1. High Monitorship Costs 
Corporations are currently and will continue to be scared of the costs 
of monitorships, which can very quickly rack up millions of dollars in 
monitorship fees.187 The most famous fee scandal, which put monitor-
ships squarely in the public eye, is probably the monitorship undertaken 
by former Attorney General John Ashcroft. Zimmer, Inc. and Zimmer 
Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Zimmer”), a company manufacturing hip 
and knee surgical implants, was one of five companies that paid finan-
cial inducements to surgeons in violation of a federal anti-kickback stat-
186 See generally id. at 569–90 (discussing the benefits of collaboration associated with 
regulatory capture). 
187 See Transparency and Integrity in Corporate Monitoring: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46–
48 (2009) (statement  of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Gov-
ernment Accountability Office) (detailing corporations’ concerns with “the overall cost 
of . . . monitorship”). 
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ute in an effort to have their products used.188 Ashcroft, with no public 
notice or bidding, was awarded an eighteen-month contract, valued at 
$28 to $52 million, to serve as a monitor to Zimmer.189 The fees associ-
ated with the monitorship were considered to be a boondoggle for Ash-
croft, the former boss of the federal prosecutor handling the case, and 
resulted in “an internal inquiry into the department’s procedures for se-
lecting outside monitors to police settlements with large companies.”190
The extreme nature of the costs of monitorship is in part due to the 
weak negotiating power corporations have with prospective monitors, 
and changing the nature of the monitorship relationship will not fix this 
problem.191 The potential monitor knows that the corporation has a lim-
ited set of individuals that the government is likely to approve to run the 
monitorship, thus the monitor has little incentive to offer a reduced rate 
or flat fee billing. Changing the structure of the relationship between the 
monitor and the corporation will not diminish the reality that those 
deemed qualified to act as monitors will often be able to demand a pre-
mium in fees and that the corporation facing the retention of a monitor 
will be forced to pay this premium.192
188 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replace-
ment Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 
27, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/Older/hips0927.rel.pdf; see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2006) (making it a felony to exchange anything of value in 
an effort to induce the referral of federal health care program business); Corporate Integrity 
Agreement Between the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services and Zimmer, Inc. (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/Older/ZimmerCIA92707.pdf (detailing Zimmer’s voluntary five-
year-long compliance program undertaken as a condition of its deferred prosecution agree-
ment). 
189 Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 
2008, at A1.  
190 Id.  
191 The Morford Memorandum sets out a variety of factors governing the selection of mon-
itors, evidencing the several layers of approval that a prospective monitor must go through. 
See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 346 (citing Morford Memorandum, supra note 
1, at 3). This extensive approval process makes it difficult for the corporation to enter into 
aggressive negotiations with potential monitors, because the class of people eligible to serve 
as monitors is quite small.  
192 I am limiting this discussion to the costs charged by the monitor and any professionals 
assisting the monitor, but the monitorship has a variety of other associated costs, like costs 
the company incurs consulting with the corporation’s separate counsel, the loss of employee 
productivity, etc. 
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There are a few possible solutions to this concern, although a robust 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.193 First, the 
payment structure of monitorships could be modified in a manner that 
would incentivize the government to take a more active role in negotiat-
ing a lower fee arrangement. Currently, the agreements resulting in the 
retention of monitors require the monitored corporation to take sole re-
sponsibility for the costs of monitorship. If one is truly concerned with 
the high costs of monitorship, then requiring the government to bear the 
burden in total, or at least split the costs of the monitorship, would ap-
pear to aid in providing the government with an incentive to assist the 
monitored corporation in finding a mutually agreeable monitor who will 
provide services at a competitive rate. The government could utilize a 
portion of the fines paid by the corporation as part of the settlement 
agreement to offset the costs of the monitorship, lessening the burden on 
public resources. And as one of the main functions of the monitorship is 
to provide the government with an additional enforcement agent, it 
would seem plausible that the government should bear at least some of 
the enforcement costs associated with the monitorship. 
Another alternative is increased judicial oversight of monitorships, so 
that an independent adjudicator is able to assess and review the moni-
tor’s fees. For example, in major bankruptcy cases, courts commonly 
use fee examiners to ensure “the reasonableness of the work billed and 
the cost of [the] work.”194 Employing this process ensures that the party 
subject to bankruptcy is not charged excessively high fees. In theory, a 
similar process could be employed for monitorships that are subject to 
court approval, but many monitorships are entered into without any 
court involvement. Even when courts are involved in approving the 
agreement establishing the monitorship, when the agreement comes in 
the form of a deferred prosecution agreement or consent order, courts 
typically do not attempt to participate in the selection process or review 
the terms of the agreement between the corporation and the government 
entity that requires the monitorship. In fact, the agreements approved by 
193 There was also the possibility of a congressional fix to the problem of excessive moni-
torship fees, but the bill died in committee in 2009 and has not been reintroduced. See Khan-
na, supra note 3, at 236 (citing Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 
1947, 111th Cong. (2009); Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 
110th Cong. (2008)). 
194 Lois R. Lupica & Nancy B. Rapoport, Best Practices for Working with Fee Examiners, 
32 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 20, 20 (2013). 
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the courts typically state that a monitor is required to be retained, but the 
monitor and the monitor’s fee structure are not identified to the court. 
There has been at least one instance where this drew criticism from a 
court.195 If courts charged with approving agreements requiring the re-
tention of monitors took a more active role in scrutinizing the terms of 
the monitorship and fee structures, it might help bring down the costs or 
curb fee abuse on the part of monitors. 
A third, more limited alternative would be to require lawyer-monitors 
to adhere to the fee obligations under the Model Rules when entering in-
to monitorship arrangements. Under Model Rule 1.5, lawyers are not al-
lowed to charge clients excessive fees.196 And if an excessive fee is 
charged, the client can file a complaint with the relevant state bar disci-
plinary authority or file a civil action against the attorney. The problem, 
of course, is that not all monitors are lawyers, leaving a whole swath of 
potential monitors outside the ambit of this solution. 
Unfortunately, none of these solutions are particularly helpful if the 
monitorship work plan is structured in a manner that belies efficient suc-
cess. If the government regulator or the monitor establishes a work plan 
that is destined to fail or that is too onerous, the costs of the monitorship 
could skyrocket even if the “fee structure” is deemed “reasonable.” The 
only real protection against that possibility would likely be a flat fee ar-
rangement for monitorships, but a flat fee arrangement may have its own 
set of disincentives for the monitor to engage in the robust investigation 
needed to ensure its recommendations are sufficiently tailored to the 
unique needs of the corporation.197
In short, there do not appear to be any easy solutions for bringing 
down the costs of monitorships, and the monitorship’s high costs are go-
ing to continue to cause corporations to balk at the idea of retaining a 
monitor. This may just be the price the corporation has to pay for “al-
lowing” the compliance failure leading to the monitorship. 
195 See Peter J. Henning, When Judges Refuse to Be Rubber Stamps, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/when-
judges-refuse-to-be-rubber-stamps. 
196 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5 (2013).  
197 See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 3, at 240 (“The core problem with a flat fee structure is 
that it treats each expert’s time as if it is fungible. This does not seem likely to be generally 
true.”). 
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2. Discovery of New Liabilities 
Corporations will also remain concerned that a monitor, who is given 
largely unrestricted access to the corporation’s records and personnel, 
may stumble upon, or go looking for, additional improper conduct that 
could result in increased liability for the corporation. Under the current 
regime, the monitor alerts the company and the government if other 
types of misconduct are found during the course of the monitorship. For 
example, a monitor retained by Willbros Group discovered “incidents” 
that the monitor “found to be significant,” which led to the monitor and 
the corporation meeting separately with the DOJ.198 The company re-
ported that these incidents could result in further investigation from the 
DOJ.199 The potential liability as a result of such revelations goes be-
yond government sanctions and could result in reputational harm and 
additional private actions brought by enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys.200
To the extent that new liabilities are a concern for corporations, they 
seem like part of the price the corporation must pay for allowing the 
misconduct to occur. Moreover, if additional wrongdoing were to be 
found, the corporation itself would likely have a duty to disclose the 
newly discovered improper conduct to the government. At a minimum, 
corporations are already subject to a variety of statutorily imposed re-
porting obligations when misconduct is discovered.201 And many settle-
ment agreements build upon this statutory requirement by requiring the 
corporation to report wrongdoing that is discovered during the term of 
the monitorship.202 Essentially, the agreement requires disclosure of sim-
198 See Warin, Diamant & Root, supra note 1, at 354 (quoting Willbros Grp., Current Re-
port (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.2 (May 20, 2010)). 
199 Id. 
200 See, e.g., Green & Podgor, supra note 54, at 86–87 (“The possibility of shareholder de-
rivative actions or other third-party civil claims looms in the background and complicates 
both the investigation and the corporation’s response.”). 
201 See id. at 89 (discussing incentives corporations have to conduct internal investigations 
into corporate wrongdoing to avoid or mitigate liability under numerous federal laws). 
202 For example, in the deferred prosecution agreement settling alleged FCPA violations 
between the DOJ and Diebold, Inc., the company agreed to pay a $25.2 million penalty and 
retain an independent compliance monitor for eighteen months. See Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement paras. 6, 10, 12, United States v. Diebold, Inc., No. 5:13-CR-464 (N.D. Ohio 
Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diebold/
combined_dpa.pdf. In addition to these requirements, Diebold committed to “continue to 
cooperate fully with the [DOJ] in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments and relat-
ed false books and records and inadequate internal controls, subject to applicable law and 
regulations” and to “cooperate fully with other domestic or foreign law enforcement authori-
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ilar criminal misconduct to that which led to the non-prosecution agree-
ment in the case, which could lead to further penalties imposed upon the 
company. Given that misconduct at the corporation has already been 
discovered, it is not surprising that the government requires the company 
to disclose at least certain categories of misconduct. 
CONCLUSION
Corporate compliance monitors have become a constant in today’s 
compliance-driven legal and regulatory state. This Article makes three 
contributions to the academic discourse regarding corporate compliance 
monitorships. First, it distinguishes the role of corporate compliance 
monitors, who are not charged solely with “monitoring” the corpora-
tion’s conduct, from the role of traditional gatekeepers, who are respon-
sible for monitoring the corporation in an effort to stop wrongdoing and 
alert the proper authorities when wrongdoing occurs. In contrast, a cor-
porate compliance monitor is responsible for identifying the compliance 
failure, determining why the failure occurred, and providing recommen-
dations on how to prevent future compliance failures. Second, the Arti-
cle determines that monitors are performing a dual function. They are 
serving as agents of the government, but they are also serving as legal 
counselors to the corporation by providing legal advice on how to im-
prove future legal and regulatory compliance. A monitor’s responsibility 
as a legal counselor has not been fully appreciated when structuring 
monitorships. Third, the Article argues that a monitor’s legal counseling 
function would be better facilitated if the monitorship operated under a 
set of bright-line rules that provided predictability for corporations and 
monitors regarding the nature of the relationship between them. The Ar-
ticle suggests that monitorships would be more effective if provided a 
statutory privilege that protects communications amongst the monitor, 
corporation, and government. Providing this privilege will encourage the 
monitor, corporation, and government to enter into a new type of rela-
tionship—the monitor-“client” relationship. 
ties and agencies . . . in any investigation of the Company, its affiliates, . . . or any other par-
ty, in any and all matters relating to corrupt payments.” Id. para. 5. 

